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ABSTRACT
This paper explains :(i) why fíxed rate loan coa~it~enta exist in a
coapetitive credit aarket wlth universal rísk neutrality and no transactions
costs, and (11) why banks exist to sell such coa~it~ents. The econo~y has each
borrower facinQ uncertainty nbout future interest ratea and about its project
"type." Each borrower aeeks to finance Sta project with a bank loan and takes
an unobservable action which, elong with the realizatíon of íts type,
deter~ines the probabillty diatriDution of its project payoff. A loan
coaaltsent ia ratlonalized on the Qrounda that it resolvea aoral hazard even
aore effectively thnn the use of inside eQUíty ln conjunctíon with apot credit.
However, the couitaent mnrket breaka down if populated by lndividual
coaaitment sellera who are econo~ically rational (not patholoQically honest),
i.e., refuae to honor comaitaent contracts whenever it is privately optimal to
do so. The existence of a bank -- dealinQ with aany borrowera -- ia ~ustifíed
on the erounds that, unlike an Sndividual co~mitment seller, even an
econo~ically rational bank can aake credible proaises to honor all its
coaaitment contracts. A perfect sequential equilibriu~ is characterized in
whlch borrowers buyinY loan comnitments choose first-best actions and the banks
se111nY thea honor their contracts.
s
CREDIBLE CO!~4MITMENTS, CONTRACT ENPORCEMENT PROBLEMS AND BANKS:
INTERMEDIATION AS CREDIBILITY ASSURANCE
I. INTRODUCTiON
A. Oblectives
Why do indlvlduals buy insurance lrom insurance com~anies and rarely irom
other individuals? Why are lndividuals willíng to pay up-front fees to tir~s
or oreanízations for the future delivery of producte or services (exaeples are
health clubs, professional organlzations, hotels, etc.) but not to other
indlviduals? Why Ss it that a person who is wllling to pay an establíshed
com~erclal airllne his Pull airfare weeks in advance of the flight is unlikely
to behave si~llarly with an individual pilot offering to fly his in a private
atrcraft? Why is lt that loan coa~it~ents are sold by banks and not by
individuals?
All these questiona have the saae answer. Piras can credibly comoit to
supply a product or servíce Sn the future in exchange for current compensation.
Indivíduals often can not. It is this notion that provides the building blocks
for our explanation of why banks exist (as cos~itnent sellers).
The goals of this paper are threefold. The first is to provide an
econoaic ratíonale for the existence of bank loan commitnents in an envíronment
characterized Dy universal risk neutrality, interest rate uncertainty and
takedown uncertaínty steAwing fro~ rando4ness in the future values of
invest~ent projecta borrowers Sntend financing wlth comwitment takedowns. The
second is to formally show that a market for loan coRSítnents can exist even
though the co~~it~ent seller has an incentive to renege on ita pro~ise to lend
at subsidtzed teras. And the third is to provide a novel .Justification for the
existence of banks. This ~ustlfication ls provided in two ateps. The flrst
step ls to show that an individual (non-íntermedíary) con~witment aeller say
have an incentive to reneYe on its promise to lend. This causes a loan
coaultment aarket brenkdown manifeated ln the abaence of market-mediated,
bllatera] (forward) credit exchanees between borrowera and couitaent sellers.
The aecond step then involves showinQ that an oreanlzational aolution,
involvinQ a benk interaedintin~ between borrowere and lenders and aelline
couitments, reatores econoaic Sncentívea to honor contracts. Thus, a bank
ariaee becauae it lends credib111ty to credit couitmenta and assures aarket
particlpanta that contracts wlll be honored.
The intended contribution of this paper ís to two atrands of the financial
interaediatíon literature. One ia the literature on loan comaitaents and the
other is the literature on the existence of financial intermediaríes.
B. The Loan ComAitment Líterature and Overview of the Model
Loan commitments in the U.S. currently amount to billions of dollars. The
forsal literature on loan comwitments is now fairly extensive and can be traced
Dack to Caopbell's (1978) partial equilibriui analysis of the supply and demand
detersínants of fixed and variable rate loan comwitments. Since then, numerous
papers have attempted to explaln why these instru~ents exist. However. until
recently,í ~ost explanations have relied on either risk aversion or
transactions costs.Z Risk aversion ís useful 1n understanding why individuals
deeand loan covnitments to Snsure thewselves against rando~ future interest
rates. However. it !s less conpelline as an explanation for the bulk of loan
comeitment demand which stews fro~ corporations owned by diversified
shareholders. 7hus, it seems isportant to explain why loan coonitoents eay be
desanded by rísk neutral aQents. While transactions costs may be useful in
understandinQ why certaín types of prearranQed lines of credit exist, it is
difflcult to use thea to explaín why aost loan co~aitments ínvolve sone
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rigidity ín the borrowing rate under the cosmitnent.3 A loan couitment with a
pure liquidlty aotivatlon ahould involve the bank lending at the comaitment
custoaer'a spot borrowing rate. But we alaost never observe auch couitments.a
Me provide a co~pctitive equíllbriu~ ~ustiflcation for loan co~aitwent
de~and by risk neutrnl agents. Thia ia achieved wlth a two-period, universally
rlak neutral econo~y in which Dorrowera have insuf[icient 1lquidity to flnance
investsent projects that will be available one period hence. They can arrange
the PínancinY externally by either purchasíng a loan coe~it~ent now for funds
availabillty one period hence or by planninQ to borrow in the spot aarket a
period froe now. The loan com~it~ent guarantees funds aL a[íxed interest rate
even though the future spot rate ís rando~. A fee sust be paid by the borrower
Por thls facillty at the ti~e of purchase of the coASit~ent. The payofP
distríbution of the borrower's project Ss affected both by an unobservable
actíon choice oP the borrower at the start of the Pirst period and by the
realization of an observable technological quality (type) paraneter at the
start of the second period. For the borrower, the commitment ís an option; it
will be exercised only if the borrower's type realization is such that
Snvest~ent in the project !s value enhancing and the commitment ofters a lower
rate than spot borrowing. The credit oarket is competitive, implying that
contracts are designed to naxlmize each borrower's expected utilíty, sub~ect to
the lender breaking even. Thia proble~ is ~odeled aa a non-cooperative (Nash)
gane between the lender and the borrower.
We beYin by showing that if the borrower is restricted to spot borrowing,
the Pareto do~ínant Nash equllíbríu~ !s welPare-distorting; it Lnvolves a
lower-than-Pirst-best action choice by the borrower. The reason is that the
loan interest rate has a distortionary ePPect on the supply of productive
3
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inputa such aa effort.5 ile then ahow that with e fixed rate loan co~sit~ent
offered to the borrower prior to its action choice, the co~~it~ent rate can be
set low enough to reatore the borrower's Sncentive to choose a first-beat
ection. whatever loas the bank ~ay suffer fro~ offering such a low interest
rnte can be recovered by charging the borrower a co~~it~ent fee at the tiee it
purchases the coasitaent. It ia assuied that the borrower has sufficient
initial liquldity to pay the couitaent lee. Surprisingly, however, we prove
that, fro~ the borrower's standpolnt, the alternative of purchasing a loan
coonitsent Pareto do~inates that of saving the ínitial liquidity and using it
as Snsíde equity ín conjunctíon with a spot loan. This part of our analysis
thus generalizes the work of Boot, Thakor and Udell (B-T-U) (1987). They
obtain the sase result with a simpler ~odel in which there is no uncertainty
about the borrower's type and comnitnents are always taken down.
C. Contract Enforcenent and the Existence of Banks
A key assusption in the above analysis -- and that of B-T-U -- is that the
bank always honors its connitment. However, since the con~nit~nent is a put
options that Is exercised by the borrower oniy when the con~itsent rate is
lower than the spot borrowing rate, a borrower takedown iwposes a loss on the
coneitaent seller. why should the connit~ent seller adhere to the terss of the
contract? When we expllcitly analyze this i ssue, we find that an individual
co~nitsent seller -- one that obtains funds fro~ depositors and sells a
co~altnent to a single borrower -- will, under sone conditions, renege on its
prosise to lend. Thus, a loan consitsent ~arket co~prised of indlvidual
lenders cannot exíst. But i[ the co~ait~ent seller is a bank -- an
intersediary that obtains funds froa depositors and sella couitnents to
nuaerous borrowers -- then we show that there exlsts a perfect sequential
4
equilibríu~ in which the bank always honors all of its com~itaents and all
coniit~ent buyers choose first-best ections. Thus, banks arise as institutions
to assure credibility.
In our nodel we per~it two situations, one in which the com~it~ent seller
can renege wlth ispunLty and the other ín whích ít is penalized. Being able to
costlessly renege corresponds ta the ubiquitoua "escape clause" in real world
loan coa~it~ent contracts. Thís clause stipulates that the con~itsent seller
need not honor a consitaent if the borrower's financial condition has
"sateríally deteriorated." we ~odel "~aterial deterioration" in order to
identify specific states in whlch reneging is costless.
Our research is related to the literature on contractual perforaance. The
problea typically studied in that literature is as follows. Two partíes, a
seller and a buyer, enter Snto a contract stipulating that the seller produce a
good and deliver it at a specified price. This contracting precedes the
observation of any cost and value inforsation by the two parties. The buyer
then oakes a transaction-specific ínvestment which has llttle value iP the
seller does not honor the contract. Next, the seller observes this production
cost. If this cost is very high, he defaults and sakes a side-paynent to the
buyer according to a prespecified legal rule called the "dasage ~easure." The
buyer's investoent declsion and the seller's decislon of whether or not to
breach the contract ]ointly deterslne the level of efficiency attained.
Shavell (1980) uses this franework to assess the econosic perfocmance of
cowaonly used damage oeasures, without persltting recontracting. Shavell
(1984) and Rogerson (1984) allow recontracting after the seller's observation
of production cost, but conclude that effíciency !s unattaínable. In all three
papers, all payoff-relevant inforaatlon can be co.municated crediDly. This
S
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assuiptlon ia relaxed in Konakaya~a, Mitsui nnd Watanabe (1986), where an
opti~al price and da~age pay~ent schedule that attains ePPícíency is deríved.
The si~ilnrities between the basic ~odel used in these papera and ours are
tranaparent. Also related to our work are papers in which reputatíon-driven,
~arket-based contract enforcement ~echanis~s are considered in settings where
aellera have an incentive to not honor their contractual coswitsents to buyers.
An exa~ple of such papers ia Kiein and Leffler (1981).
What sets our paper apart fros these is that the (com~it~ent) seller's
incentive to honor Sts contract can be guaranteed neither through explicit
legal reaedies nor through ímplicit, ~arket-based reward~punishment ~echanisas.
Thia is not to say that these effects are not isportant, but we take this
scenarío as the starting point of our analysis and show that an organizational
solution to the contract enforcement proble~n works precisely in the
circusstances in which a non-organizational solution fails. The idea
foraalized here is that it is ~ore costly for an organization to not honor its
contractual commítments than it is for an lndividual seller. When a given
structure of penalties under the law cannot guarantee that Sndividuals will
abide by contracts, there is potential n~arket failure which is effectively
prevented by the emergence of organizations. Thus, our approach seems capable
of aore generally explaíning why Pirms exíst (see, for exan~ple, Wílliamson
(1975)1. We have chosen to focus on financial intereediaries to lend
apecíficity to our analysis. The key difference Detween our research and the
existing líterature on financial intersediary existence (Hoyd and Prescott
(1986), Díaiond (1984), Mtllon and Thakor (1985) and Raaakrishnan and Thakor
(1984) are recent exasples) is that the latter assumes that contracts will be
honored and retionalizes intersediary exístence on the grounds that it reduces
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expected contracting costs by more ef[iciently resolving moral hazard or pre-
contract private information problems.
The rest of the paper ia organized as follows. Sectíon II presents the
baaic ~odel and táe Pull-information eqnillbriu~. Section III introducea ~oral
hazard and ratlonalizes loan commltmenta under the assumptton that commitmenia
Mill alwaya be honored. In Section IV, contract enforce~ent problems are
introduced and a rationale for the existence of banks is provided. Sectíon V
concludes. All formal proofs are in an appendix (Appendíx II). Throughout, we
are careful to distinguísh between "banks," "lenders," and "commítment
sellers." The term "lender" designates an individual lender, be it a
commítment seller or a spot lender, whereas a"bank" is either a spot lender or
a commitment seller that deals with many borrowers. The term "commitment
seller" designates elther a lender or a bank that sells commitments.
II. THE MODEL AND THE PULL I~FORMATION SOLUTION
A. The Model
(1) Preferences and Market Structure: Consider a perfectly competitive,
two period credít market ín which lenders compe[e for both deposits and loans.
All agents are risk neutral. Consequently, credit contracts are designed to
maximlze the net expected profits of borrowers subject to the constraints that
the lender's depositors receive nn expected return equal to the riskless rate
and the lender's shareholders earn zero expected profit. Deposlts are
completely uninsured.~ Por símplicity, we assume that currently the lender has
no equlty capítal that can be used as a funding source for the loan.8 The
supply of deposits is perfectly elastíc at the spot riskless rate. Taxes are
assumed to De zero throughout.
7
~~{~ Agent Tvpes Endowments and Basic Tiae Structure: There are two
ti~e períods. The first period begins at t-0 and ends at t-1. The second
period Deglns at t-1 and ends at t-2. There are potentially five different
types of agents in the econo~y and there is a countable infinity of each agent.
Each type 1-A agent has a cash endowment of Rfi at t-0 and nothing else, where
Rf ia the (coamonly known) síngle period risklesa interest factor at t-0. Type
1-B agents are not in existence at t-0 but coAe ínto existence at t-1, each
with a S1 cash endowment. There is no useful distinction at t~l between type
1-A agents who save their ínitial liquidíty for a period, and type 1-B agents.
Both these agent types are potential depositors. Type 1-A agents can lend
thelr money to commitment sellers at t-0, enabling them to make (forward)
commitments to lend at t-1. Type 1-B agents can only be depositors in the spot
credit sarket at t~l.
Type 2-A agents are endowed with projects at t-0. There is no investment
-- either capital or labor -- required to activate these projects. Each
project yields a fixed payoff of S~ 0 at ta2. However, the payoff is
conpletely unobservable to ali except the agent who owns the project. Thus.
this agent can consume this payoff without detection. The only way that the
agent owning the project can be prevented fron consuming S is if a court of law
"attached" the project and took legal possession of it. In that case, the
court can divert S' to some other agent. We assume that S' - e E(0. S) is very
small to capture the idea that there is a high verification and title transfer
cost associated wtih takíng over the project; S' can thus be viewed as S minus
the dissipative cost of diverting consumptlon away from the initial owner of
the project. Each type 2-A is a potential (individual) con~itsent seller and
groups of type 2-A agents are potential banks. Type 2-B agents have no project
8
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endowment, but they are observationally índistinguishable at t-0 from type 2-A
agents. Thus, Lhey could mimíc these agents. A verificatíon cost of v could
be incurred to perfectly dístingulsh a type 2-A agent from a type Z-B agent.
Type 3 agents are endowed at t-0 with options to invest in pro}ects at
t-1. Ench of these pro}ects requires a SI investment at t-1. The pro}ect pays
of[ at t-2 and the payoff distríbutton depends on an unobservable action choice
of the type 3 agent. At t-0, each type 3 agent starts out with a llquidity of
L E(0, Rtl). Since this liquidity can be carried for a period at Rf,
the type 3 agent will have LRf of its own funds to invest at t-1 SP it simply
saves its liquidíty and borrows the rest tn the spot market at t-1. But since
LRf ~ 1, external financing wlll still be needed to activate the project.
To recapitulate, type i-A and 1-B agents are the depositors, type 2-A
agents are the lenders (or commitment sellers or banks), and type 3 agents are
the borrowers ín this economy. Henceforth, we will refer to these agents as
depositors, lenders and borrowers. References to agents by (primitive) types
will only be made where needed. The reason why a lender is needed to
intermediate between a depositor and a borrower wlll become apparent later.
(111) First Period (Environmental Uncertainties and Decisions): At tLO.
each borrower has two cholces. It can either plan to save its initial
liquldity entirely for a period and then borrow 1- LRf in the spot market at
t-1, or lt can purchase a loan commitnent at t-0. The coAmltment will
guarantee availability of credit (up to a predetermined maximum) at trl at some
contractually predetermíned (fixed) interest rate. To purchase the conmítment,
the borrower must pay a commitment fee, g ~ 0, at t-0. Because the commitment
fee will be financed Prom the initíal liquidity, L, the borrower will need a
larger loan under the co~mltment than vith spot borrowing. It ís assumed
9
throughout that when a Dorrower purchases a loan co~mitment, the purchase
becomes common knowiedge.
At t-0, the Dorrower can undertake one of three actions, 0, a1, or a2 with
nl ~ aZ i 0. The ection choice affects the payoff distribution of the project
the borrower will hnve evailable at t-1. (The manner of thls efPect wíll be
~ade precise shortly.) The action a1 shouid be viewed as developmental
activíty that precedes the actual investment in the project. It includes R 6
D, pre-product introduction advertising, aales promotions through featured
canpaigns, etc. Undertaking the action is costly for the borrower. The costs
are V(ai), with m~ V(al) ~ V(a2) ~ V(0) - 0. We define V(ai) as the value of
the effort disutility at ts2, i.e., 1t is the compounded value ( at t~2) of che
borrower's disutility for having chosen action ai at t-0. (This i s simply a
scaling issue). If the borrower chooses az0, then the project it invests in at
tzl will yield a cash flow of zero almost surely at t-2 ( the end of the second
period). In what follows, we shall assume that, if an equilíbrium exists, then
the borrower's reservation utility of zero ( which results from choosing a-0) is
always exceeded by the equilibrius ut111ty (associated with an action choice al
or a2). Thus, a~0 will never be an optimal action choíce and henceforth, we
will si~ply assume, for the most part, that the borrower's feasible action
space i s {al, a2}.
Having chosen its action at ta0, the borrower faces three types of
uncertainties. First, ít does not know the actual (randon) cash flow that will
be realized at t~2. Second, it does not even know the probability distribution
of this cash [low9 that it wiil face at t-1. The reason is that this
probability distribution is affected both by the borrower's action choice at
t-0 and by some technological "quality" parameter related to the project. This
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technological parameter will become known only at t-1. Third, the borrower and
the lender are currently unaware of the rlskless spot rate that will occur at
t-1, although its probabillty distribution ia common knowledge. This
uncertalnty is important to the borrowec i[ it accesses the spot credit market
at t-1, because its spot borrowine rate will depend on the prevailing riskless
spot rete. By purchasing a fíxed rate loan couítment, however, the borrower
can eliminate uncertainty about ita loan interest rate.
ile assume that, wíth spot credít contracting, the only instruments
avallable to the lender are: (í) the loan slze (or how much equity to ask the
borrower to put up) and (11) the loan interest rate.10 The same instru~ents
are available with a loan co~mitment, except that there is an additional degree
of freedom in that part of the borrower'a equity can be offered to the lender
(commitment seller) at t-0 as a commitment fee,ll
lív) Second Period (Investment Technoloev Environmental Uncertainties
and Credit Utillzation Decísions): Having made its decisions regarding action
choice (a1 or a2) and contract choice (loan commitment or spot borrowing), the
borrower makes two observations at t-1. One observation is of the
technological quality parameter, k, of Sts project. Let k E(G, B}, where G
índicates "good" quality and B indicates "bad" qualíty. The parameter k should
be Snterpreted as a summary statistic representing market demand conditions,
productíon costs, etc., that the borrower was unaware of ínitially but learns
prior to investing capltal in the project. Viewed at t-0, all agents have
homogeneous bellefs about k, as embodied in the loilowíng probabSlLty measures:
Pr (k - G) - W E(0, 1), Pr (k - B) - 1-~Y, where "Pr" denotes probability.
The second observatlon the borrower makes Ss of the spot riskless rate.
Conditional on the single period spot riskless interest factor of Rf at t~0,
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the aingle period spot risklesa intereat factor, R, at t-1 can take one of two
poasible values, RR or Rh. we assuae 1 c RR c Rh c s. Viewed at t-0, ell
agenta have ho~ogeneous belíefs about R, aa e~bodied in the Pollowing
probabillty aeasurea: Pr (R - RA) - 6 E(0, 1), Pr ( R - Rh) - 1- 6. We will
refer to R as the rando~ variable representing the spot rískless factor at t-1
and R~ E{R~, Rh} ns its reallzation. It is assuied that, for any Dorrower, k
and R are lndependent rando~ variables and that their realizations at t~l are
coneon knowledge. Moreover, the k's for dífferent borrowers are also
independent randoa variables.
Navíng observed k at t-1, the borrower knows the cash flow distribution of
its lnvest~ent opportunity; the only re~aining uncertainty for the borrower is
the actual cash flow that wiil be realízed at t-2. Specifically, the cash flow
will be X(ai,k) with probabilíty (w.p.) p(ai) and zero w.p. 1- p(ai), with
X(al,k) ~ X(a2,k) v k E{G, B} and X(a1.G) ~ X(ai,B) v a1 E{al, a2}. For any
two borrowers with the sane ai and the sawe k, the project cash flows are
identical and índependently distributed (í.í.d.) randoA variables. with 1ts
observations of k and R~ in hand. the borrower now ~akes its investment and
credit utilization decislons. If it had purchased a loan comnitment at t-0,
then ít eust decide: (i) whether to Snvest Sn the pro~ect and (11) whether to
take down the loan comaitaent or borrow in the spot aarket. If it did not
purchase a loan cooaitoent. its only decision ís whether to invest in the
pro~ect at the currently avaílable credít ter~s. Table 1 susmarízes the timing
of realizations of rando~ variables and the sequence of decisions.
There is potential ~oral hazard since the action ai of the borrower is
unobservable to the lender, althouEh in this sec[ion we assu~e that the lender
can freely observe the borrower's action choice. Thus, despite knowing the
12
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technological qualíty of the pro~ect, the lender generally does not know the
borrower's payoff distributíon when it lends to it. This ~oral hazard ditfers
fro~ that !n the standard prlncipal-agent ~odel in that the action choice (at
t-O) ín our ~odel precedes the contract choice of the lender (at t-1). That
is, the infor~ed agent ~oves first here. At t-1, the loan interest Pactor
charged by the lender for a spot loan can then be written as r(ai~Rj). This
seans that the spot credlt price dependa on the realization of the riskless
spot interest factor, R~ E(Rg, Rhj, and on the lender's beliefs about the
borrower's actíon choíce, ai E(ai, a2j.i2 Note that r does not depend on the
lender's observation of k since the technological quallty oC the project
affects only the cash flow in the good atate and not the probability of
success. The lender extends (spot) credit only if the loan lnterest rate that
allows it to at least break even, given its bellef about aí, is such that the
borrower's repayment obligation is exceeded by the cash flow in the good state.
Thus, the cash flow size has no impact on r, conditional on credit being
extended.
At t~2, the end of the second period, the borrower observes the actual
realization oC its project cash flow. Under asymmetríc informatíon, however,
the lender can only observe whether or not the borrower's project was
successful. It can not observe the actual cash flow. IP the lender extends a
loan at a given interest rate, then all it knows -- or can agree with the
borrower upon -- is that, given the borrower's optisal (unobservable) action
choice in response to the offered loan contract, the return in the successful
state exceeds the proeised repayaent.13 It is, however, coewon knowledge that
the project cash flow is zero 1[ there is failure and it ís posltlve íf there
ís success. All of these assumptions taken together ieply that (costless) ex
13
post payoff-contingent contracta of the Bhattacharya (1980) type nre precluded.
Moreover, given the ex post unobservability assumptlon, the analyses of Diamond
(1984), Gale and Hellwig (1985), and Townsend (1979) can be uaed to show that
the optlmal contract between the bank and the borrower 1s a pure debt
contract.i4
B. The Pull Inforwation Outcome
Under full information, the lender can costlessly observe both the
borrower's action choice and its return in the auccessful atate. Moreover,
type 2-A and type 2-B agenta are observationally distinguíshable so that only
the former become lenders. If the borrower self-financea, its expected utility
can be written as (throughout this paper, the borrower's alternatives to
investing in the project are current consumption or, equivalently, investment
in the riskless asset; thus, all expected utílities are to be taken as the
Sncrements in expected utility resulting from investing in the project, i.e.,
the total expected utility from Snvesting in the project minus the expected
utility from investing in the riskless asset)
P(ai)[~i' X(a1. G) i (1 - ~i'}X(ai. B)] - V(ai) - [9 RQ , {1 - 9}Rh] (1)
assuming that the borrower has sufficíent llquidity to self-fínance. (Assume
for the soment that the borrower starts out at t~0 wíth a liquidity of Rfl so
that it has exactly S1 to invest at t~1.) In ( 1) the last term is the
compounded value of the S1 investment made at t-1. Aa done 1n ( 1), we shall
always write expected utility in terms of its wealth equivalent at tr2. We
shall assume that the borrower prefers to choose a1 when it self-finances.
That is.
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P(al) [W X (e1,G) ~ {1-`f'} X (a1,8)J - V(al) - (9 RR t {1 - A} Rh]
P(a2) (q X (a2.G) . {1-~Y} X (a2,8)] - V(a2) - [6 RA t {1 - 6} Rh]
which means
p(al) [~ x(al,G) f tl-V~} x(al.B)] - vlal)
~ (PR-1)
p(a2) (w X(a2.G) t{1-~F} X(a2.B)] - V(a2)
By (PR-1) we mean the first parametric restrictlon on the model. As we
proceed, we will impose more parametric restrictions on the model. Henceforth.
we will assume [hat
Rf - 6 RA . [1 - 6]Rh.
Now suppose the borrower's liquidity. L, is insufficient to permit
complete self-financíng. An amount 1- LRf ~ 0 must be borrowed at t-1. The
borrower's expected utlllty can now be written as
EU(ai) ~ P(ai)[~{X(ai, G)-al) ~{1-~Y}{X(a1. B)-al}] - V(ai)
- LRf{8 RR~{1-A}Rh], (2)
where
al i: [1 - LRf](e r ( a1~RQ) ~ [1-e)r(a11Rh)].
In (2), al is the Dorrower's expected repayment obligatlon to the bank and
LRf[6 RQ t(1~}Rh] is the compounded value ot the 1lquldity (equity) the
borrower rellnquishes by ínvesting in the proJect. The borrower's decision
~
problem is to choose its optimal action, ai, to satisfy
s
ai E argmax E U(ai). (3)
a1E{a1,a2)
s
It Ss straightforward to verify that ai is chosen to yield the borrower the
same expected utllity it enjays when St has sufficient liquidity to completely
self-finance, i.e., the fírst best is attained. To see th1s, note first that,
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in a co~petitive credit ~arket, lenders price their apot loans to earn zero
expected profits. This ie because the equity the lender has in its own project
does not aupport the loan. Thus.
- RjIP(ai) vai E{a1, a2}, R~ E{RA, Rh}. (4)
a little alQebra, we obtain
Plaí) [~Y Xlai. G) .{1-V'}X(ai. B)} - V(ai) - Rf.
which ia the sa~e aa its expected utility with coaplete self-financinQ,
expressed in (1). Thus, a1 - n1, and the first best Se attained.
III MORAL HA2ARD AND A RATIONALE FOR LOAN COMMITMENTS ( NO EX POST CONTRACT
ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS)
We have seen in the previous section that, absent ~oral hazard, the
borrower can use spot credit without welfare depletion. We now exas~ine what
happens when the borrower's action choice is ex post unobservable to the
lender. There is also i~perfect ex post observability of the tersínal cash
flow; the lender can observe success or failure of the project, but not the
. actual cash flow.
A Definition of EQUilibriu~n
In this section we study, in each case, a(fulfilled expectations)
con~petitive Nash eyuilibriuw. The equilibriua is affected by the beliefs of
~arket participants. Consider spot credit contractine first. At t-0, the
borrower foras a belief about Lhe ( best) contract that will be avaílable to it
in the spot credit ~arket at t-1, and this belief evidea its action choice.
Si~ilarly, at t-1. the lender for~s a belíef about the actíon chosen by the
borrower at t-0 (since borrowers' action choices are unobservable), and this
belíef affects the contract it is wi111nY to offer. The equílíbrius
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allocatíons are condl[loned on a specifled system of belíefs. and the
equ111briuw is such thnt these beliefs are rationalized (expectations are
ful[illed.) Such an equllibrium !n the spot credit warke[ obtains when the
following conditions are met.
(1) Conditional on a given system of beliefs, the lender ofCers a set
(posaibly a singletort) of credit contracta such that, given the
contractinY envlronment, there does not exist another (feasible) set of
contracts that wakes the borrower strictly better ofC under that systew
of bellefs. (Feaslbilíty here meana that the lender earns non-negatíve
expected profit.) Moreover, the expected utility of the borrower with
the chosen contract is non-negative.
(11) The borrower's belief is rationalized in that the best credit contract
avaílable at t:l is the same as the one the borrower belteved would be
available to it when St chose 1ts action at t-0.
(111) The credit contract taken by the borrower at t-1 is such that the
offering lender earns zero expected profit on the contract, condítional
on the borrower having chosen the action the lender believes it chose.
(iv) The lender's belief is rationalized Sn that the borrower chooses the sawe
action at t-0 that the lender belíeves lt did.
when we consider a setting in which lenders can offer loan commitments and
also lend in the spat market, the Nash eQuilibrium has all of the Peatures
listed above, but it also satisfies the following additional condítions. (Por
nor, we take as iven the assumptíon that the commitment seller will always
honor the loan cowmitment contract, i.e., lend to the borrower when the
commitment is exercised.)
(i) Conditional on a given system of beliefs, the cowaitwent seller offers a
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set (possibly n aingleton) of loan couit~ent contracts at t-0 such that
there doea not exiat eny other (feasible) loan co~~it~ent contract that
~akea the Dorrower atrictly better off under that syste~ of beliefs.
Moreover, the expected utíllty of the borrower rith the chosen contract
is non-negative.
(ii) Given the conditiona that: ( a) the borrower Mill exercise the cosaitment
at t-] if it otfers better ter~s than spot credit and use spot credít
otherwise, and (b) the com~iteent seller will honor the loan commitment
contract, the co~sitsent seller earns zero expected profit on the loan
coma~itment if the Dorrower chooses the action the compitment seller
believes it will.
(Sií) The commitment seller's belief is rationalized in that the
borrower
taking the loan co~nitment chooses the action the commitment seller
believes it will.
Por future reference, note that the commitment seller's own project
will
never be prematurely liquidated as long as it honors its conaitment. Premature
liquldatíon is n punitive ~easure that is relevant only when contract
enforcement problems are explícitly recognized.
B Spot Credit With No Borrower Egulty
For ~oral hazard to exist. we ~ust have a sítuation in which the
borrower
has an incentive to exploit the lender's infor~ational handicap. To
characterize a benchmark case, we assuse for now that the borrower takes a S1
loan at t:], S.e.. St does not use any of its initiaily available
liquidity.
Moreover. the borrower consumes its Sníttal liquidíty at t-0, leavine the
lender with a zero payoff in case the project fails. That is, if
the lender
prLces its spot loan at t~l under the belief that the borrower chose a] at tz0,
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then the borrower should choose a2 at tz0 in anticioation of such a prlcing
polícy by the lender. The following para~etrlc restriction ensures this.
D(a2){w(X(a2,G) - r(a1~RA)] . A[1-~][X(a2,B) - r(al(RA)]
~ w[1~J[X(a2.G) - rlal(Rh)) . [1-w][1-A][X(a2.8) - r(a11Rh)l} - V(aZ)
i (PR-2)
P(aI)(A W(x(e1.G) - r(a1~RA)] . e(i-w][x(a1.B) - r(aI,RR)]
t ~(1~)(X(a1,G) - r1e11RA)] . [1-wJ[l~J[X(a1.B) - r(a1~Rh)l} - V(a1)
te
where E is an arbitrarily spall positive number. (PR-2) will be assumed to
hold [hroughout. It says that the Pirst best credit contract is not incentive
co~patible. (PR-2) is actually stronger than this since it says that the
borrower's expected utility fro~ choosing a2 exceeds that froa choosing al by
an aiount greater than some small positive nuAber, e. The reason Par assuaing
such alackness in this condition will becone apparent later. It should be
noted that this moral hazard probleo exists despite borrower risk neutrality.
This ís Sn contrast to the standard result of principal-agent models that a
fírst best can be reached with a risk neutral agent. Underlying that
"standard" result is the assunption that linited liabilíty is not a concern,
eíther because the agent has no líoited liabílity protection provided by the
contracting environment or because debt is riskless. We have rísky debt here
with li~ited liabillty. Thus, the borrower (agent) !s unable to (credibly)
guarantee a sure paysent to the lender, giving rise to ~oral hazard.
In addition to (PR-2), we also introduce so~e para~etric restrictions that
will prove useful Sn narrowing down the range oC possibiliiies in this eadel.
Before doing that, however, we need the tollowíng notation. DeCine a random
variable ~ 3(k, R) as follows:
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El ~(G. RA). E2 ~(G. Rhl. E3 a(8. RA) and E4 ~(B, Rh).
Let 8~(E1. E2. E3. E4) be the state space of E. We w111 refer to E as taking
values in 2 to ~ean that the realization of E can be Ei wlth 1 E{1, 2, 3, 4).
The re~alning para~etric restrictions are now stated below.
(i) X(a2,k) - r(n11Rh) c 0 vai E{nl, a2}, k E{G, B}
(11) X(a2,k) - r(a11RA) ~ 0 vai E{al, a2}, k E{G, B) (PR-3)
(111) X(el,k) - r(a11Rj) ~ 0 vai E{al, n2}, E E c,1E4
(iv) X(a1,B) - r(a11Rh) c 0 vai E{al, a2)
where the notation ~1E4 aeans all the elewents of `a except E4. The
interpretations of (PR-3) are as follows. By (i) we ~ean that a borrower which
has chosen a2 will never take spot credit at t~l if the riskless spot rate is
high, regardless of its project's technological quality and the lender's belief
about its action choice. By (ii) we ~ean that a borrower which has chosen a2
will always seek spot credit at t~i )f the rískless spot rate is low,
regardless of its project's technological quality and the lender's belief about
its action choíce. By (iii) we aean that a borrower which has chosen al will
seek spot credit in all circunstances except when its project's technological
quality is bad and the spot riskless rate Ss high; (iv) says that in that case,
the borrower will not want spot credlt. The next paranetric restríction is
~[1-6}P(aí)[X(a1. G) - r(ailRh)l - V(aí) c 0 v ai E{al, a2). (PR-4)
Thís condition, taken in conjunction with (iv) in (PR-3), iaplies that, if the
borrower anticipates being rationed in the spot credit earket whenever the spot
rískless rate is low, lt will prefer autarky to borrowing, and choose a- 0 at
t~0.
The final paraeetric restrictlon is
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P(a2) (A W[X(a2, G) - r(a2(RA)J . 6(1-~J[X(a2, B)-r(a2~R~)J
- V(a2) ~ 0. (PR-S)
All that this ínequallty says !s that the borrower will choose to participa[e
in the spot credit ~arket even though it can borrow only in the low interest
rate state and recelves a correctty príced loan for havíng chosen a2.
We would líke (PR-1) to be co~patíble with the other para~etric
restríctions. That ís, we want al to be the desired action choice ín the first
bes[ (cosplete self-financing) case even when (PR-3) holds. Note that, gíven
(PR-3), the borrower will never invest at t-1 if the spot riskless rate Ss high
and it had chosen a2 at t~0, even though St can completely self-finance the
ínvest~ent. The reason is that it can do better by investing in the riskless
asset instead. Si~ilarly, if it chose al at t-0, then ít will never invest
when k-B and RrRh because investing 1n the riskless asset is a superior
alternative. Thus, using (PR-3) ylelds the tollowing version of (PR-1)15
P(al)IA w(X(a2,G) - rla11RA)] t A[1-w][X(a1,B) - r(a11R~)J
t (1-e1~[x(a1,G) - r(a1~Rh)]} - v(al)
(PR-1')
P(a2){9 w[X(a2.G) - r(a21R~)l ' 9[1-~][X(a2,B) - r(a2IR~)]? - V(a2)
Throughout the resainíng analysis, we assume that (PR-1') through (PR-5)
hold. The reason Por imposing these paraeetrlc restrictions on the ~odel is
that we want to focus on a ltaited set ot outcoaes. This not only eases our
covputatlonal burden but also enables the econosic intuition to be brought out
sore sharply. Por the oost part, these restrictíons are useful in shortening
the proof of the clai~ (to fol]ow) that Nash equílibrín in the spot credlt
aarket are inefficient, i.e., involve welfare distortíons relative to first
best. SSnce this is the baslc preaise with whích we Degín our analysis, the
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paraaetric restrictiona do not sacrifice stuch generality. Ne now have the
following result.
LEldMA 1: There exists at least one co~petitive Nash equilibriui Sn the spot
credit ~arket. The Nash eQuílibriu~ yielding the borrower its highest expected
utillty is the one in which the lender charges r(a2~RA) If R~ - RA nnd c(a2~Rh)
if Rj - Rh. In this equilibriu~ the borrower experiences a lower than first
best expected utility.
Thia result ia intuitive. The coepetitive spot borrowing rate is so high
-- parttcularly in the high interest rate state -- that the borrower's share of
the tersinal cash flow is too low to induce a choice of the first best action,
aI. Thus, a2 is chosen. The key observation is that any increase ín the loan
interest rate diAinishes the borrower's sarginal return to effort. This
incentive effect is distortionary because it causes the borrower to curtail
effort supply,ló
C. The Deoosit Contract
Por lenders that only enter the spot credit earket at t~l, the deposit
contract is simple. Consider initially a lender that deals with just one
borrower. It raises S1 fro~ depositors to wake a loan to the borrower. If the
borrower's pro,Ject is successful at t~2, the lender passes along all of the
principal and interest it collects to the depoaitors. If the pro~ect fails.
depositors get nothíng. (Note that, given our earlier assumptions, depositors
cannot clai~ S unless there is court interventíon which is unnecessary if
depositors take into account the probabillty of project failure ex ante in
prícing deposits.) Nith ~any borrowers, ez post returns will be divided on a
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pro rata basis anong depositors. However, sínce depositors are rlsk neutral.
diversi[ication across ~any borrowers does not enhance their welfare. Thus,
nothing is lost by ai~ply assuming that a dollar raised lro~ a specific group
of depositors !s ear~arked for a speclfic borrower and that those depositors
get paid !n full if the borrower's project aucceeda and get nothing if it
fails. The bank will not have to pay any additional (risk) pre~iu~ for auch a
policy.
For a bank that íssues a loan comiitment at t-0, the deposit contract is
as follows. The bank issues a two-period CD at t-0 and raíses SRI1, At t-0,
the bank invests in the riskless asset -- so that it has S1 in loanable funds
available at t-1 -- since risky lnvest~ent opportunitles Sn this economy are
only avatlable at t-1. At t-1, íf state E2 occurs for the loan commitnent
customer, then it takes down the commitment and the bank lends it S1. At t-2.
depositors are paid gRfRh . d if the borrower's project is successful, and
gRfRh Sf the project fails. Note that gRfRh is the compounded value of the
commitment fee, conditional on state E2 occurring. We assume throughout that
the comn~itment Pee is always invested in the riskless asset. (Thls is an
innocuous assunption.) In states fl. E3 and E4 for the borrower in question,
the loan commitment is not taken down. In these cases, the bank seeks out some
other borrower to lend to in the spot credit market at t~l. We w111 show laier
in this section that all borrowers who purchase loan commit~enta at t-0 choose
al. Pro~ among these borrowers, those who fínd themselves in states Ei and E3
at t-1 will be candidates for spot loans. We will assume that the borrower the
bank lends Sts idle funds to ia one of theae borrowers. Thus, the interest
factor charged to the borrower is Rj~p(al) where Rj E{RA, Rh}, Suppose, on the
other hand, the bank lends lts money at t~l to e borrower that did not purchase
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a loan commitment at t-0. Then we know from our earlier analysis that such a
borrower chose a2 at t-0. Thus, if the competitive loan interest factor the
bank chacges is Rj~p(a21. In other words, the purchase of a loan commitment at
t-0 affects the borrower's borrowing rate Sn the Puture even if St does not
exercise the couitment. Since depositora can always wrlte (at t-0) a contract
that makes their payoff at t-2 condltional upon the kind of borrower (one who
purchased a comsitment at t-0 veraus one who did not) the bank lends to in the
spot market at t-1, we will assume, without loss of generality, that the bank's
spot lendíng is only to a borrower who had purchased a commitment at t:0.17
Thus, !f either state E1 or E3 occura at t-1, the depositors are paíd
gRPRa ~ R~[p(a1)]-1 1f the (spot) borrower's project is successful and gRfRQ if
-1
it Pails. If state E4 occurs, then depositors are paid gRPRh ; Rh[p(a11] if
the spot borrower's project is successful and gRPRh if it fails.
We see then that the two-period CD contract ia structured in such a way
that the depositors always get the same expected return over two periods
(Rf - 1) regardless of whether the loan commitment purchaser takes down the
loan commitment or lets it expire unexercised. Moreover, the bank always makes
a zero profit. Thus, the state-contíngent CD contract is consistent with the
competitive aarket structure we have assumed.
All of this rests, however, on the critical assumption that the bank
always honors the loan commitment. The questlon of what happens if the bank
reneges on its promise 1s taken up !n the next section.
D Summary of Key Assumotions
The key assumptions made thus far are summarized below to enable the
reader to keep track of the model structure.
(1) A1l agents are risk neutral, the lender has zero initial equity capital,
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and the credit market ia perfectly competitive.
(11) There are three points in time, t-0, 1. 2. At t-0, the (prospectíve)
borrower chooses an action (zero, low or high). At t-1, n technological
quality paraieter ía realízed (good or bad). In combination, actlon and
quallty deteriine the payoff diatributíon of the borrower's project.
Capitnl lnveatment in the project occura at t-1 and a random cash ilow
(zero or positlve) ia recovered at t-2. The borrower's action choice
and the realized cash ilow are ex post unobservable at t-2. However,
the lender can observe whether the project failed (zero cash flow) or
succeeded (positíve cash flow). All else is common knowledge.
(1111 Condítional on a known single period riskless interest rate at t-0, the
rlskless spot rate at tal can be either low or high. The riskless spot
rate and the project's technological quality are independent random
variables and the riskless spot rate does not aPfect the project's
payoff distribution.
(ív) In the first best case -- when the borrower completely self-finances its
project -- the high action ís preterred by the borrower to the low
action. However, complete self-financing is not possible since the
borrower's available liquídlty at t-1 ís less than the Si investment
required for the project.
(v) There ia moral hazard when the lender lends to the borrower. That is.
if the lender prices its spot loan at t-1 under the belief that the
borrower chose the hlgh actlon at t-0, the borrower will, in fact.
choose the low action at t-0 ín anticípation of such a pricing policy.
(vi) A borrower who chooses the low action at t~0 will never ínvest in the
project at t-1 if the spot riskless rate Ss high, regardless of the
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lender's belief about ita action choice. Such a borrower rill, however,
invest at t-1 if the spot riskless rate is lor, regardless of the
lender'e Delief about its action choice.
(v11) A borrower who chooses the hlgh actíon at t-1 will always Snvest ín the
project at t-1 unless the "worst" combination of events occurs, i.e.,
1ts technologlcal project quality is low and the riskleas spot rate is
high. In that case, the borrower does not invest.
(viii) At t-0, if the borrower believes it wíll be ratíoned at t-1 ín the event
that the lor interest rate is realized, then it will prefer autarky
(choose a zero action) to investment and partícipatíon ín the credit
market at t-1. But !f it believes that ratloning will occur only in the
high interest rate state, then it will invest and participate in the
credit warket, i.e., it will at least choose the low action at tz0 and
borrow at the available credit terms at t-1 for investment purposes.
(ix) The purchase of a loan commitment at t-0 ís publicly observable and
becomes common knowledge at t-0.
(x) The lender iasues a two-period CD at tLO. This CD stipulates a state-
contingent payoff vector for depositors at t-2. The depositors' payoff
at t~2 depends on the realization of the riskless spot rate and the
borrower's takedown decision at t-1 as well as on whether the borrower's
project succeeds or fails at t-2. The depositors' payoff vector ís
desígned to ensure that the deposítors' expected return (viewed at tL0)
is the same (and equal to the riskless rate) regardless of the
borrower's takedown declsion.
E SDOt Credit With Borrower EQUity Versus Loan.Commitments
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It is the distortionary lncentíve effect of the borrowinQ rate that
creates roo~ for the e~erYence of contractual ~echanis~s to reduce the welfare
lass attributable to ~oral hazard. Me conslder two aechanis~s. One calls for
the borrower to províde (lnstde) equity and reduce !ts spot borrowinQ. Th1s Is
the atandard approach to copínY with mornl hazard ( see Jensen and Mecklin~
(1978), for example). The other calls for the borrower to use its Snitial
liquidity to purchase a loan cos~lt~ent instead. In this subsection we conpare
the borrower's welfare under each slteraative and show that a loan comnltment
alwavs strictlv Pareto dominates the soot credit cu~ eauitv outcome. Our
approach is to show that the asount of equity input required to índuce a choice
of al strictly exceeds (in present value terss) the comAitment fee required to
induce a choice of al. Thus, with a sufficiently bindine constraint on initial
llquidtty, a loan comnitment wlll restore fírst best action incentives but
borrower equity partlcipation will not. In what follows we assume that the
comnitment seller always honors its contract and lends to the borrower whenever
the commitment is exercised. In the loan commitment contract, we take
-1ó E(RA[p(aI)] . Rh[p(al)j-1), so that the commitment may expire unexercised.
Tabie 1 summarizes the different states and the borrower's takedown and
investment behavior in those states.
THEOREM 1: Assumine that the commitment seller wlll always honor its
commitment, there exists a loan commitment contract that induces the borrower
to choose a first best actíon and yields the comsitment seller zero expected
profít. Moreover, there exist values of the borrower's Snitial liquidíty, L,
for which this loan conmituent contract strictly Pareto dowinates any spot
credit ~arket equilibriu~ (attainable with partial equlty financínY) and
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produces a first best level of expected utility for the borrower.
This 1s a surprising result. A well known approach to coping with the
moral hazard linked to external flnancinQ ia to require the fírm to supply more
inside equity. In the limit, complete self-fínancinY (all inslde equity)
eliiinates moral hazard. However, a firm rith demand for investment funds that
outstrips its available liquidity will be compelled to seek external financing.
In our model, this external financing is (optimally) raised through a risky
debt contract. The existing literature says that the distortion-minimizing
solution Ss for the borrower to use all of its available liquidity as an equity
input and obtain debt financing for the rest. The presumption, of course, is
that the borrower has access only to the spot credit market. What we have
demonstrated is that the borrower with access to a forward credit market should
purchase a loan commitment rather than save its liquidity for use as equity in
combínation with a spot loan.
The intuition behind this result is best understood in two steps. Pirst,
we will see why a loan commitwent yields the borrower its tirst best expected
utility. At t-0 the borrower purchases a loan commitment that guarantees funds
availability at t~l at a fíxed interest rate. The contract stipulates that the
borrower pay the commitment seller a conmitment fee g ~ 0 at t-0 and receive a
S1 loan at some fixed interest factor ó. Now, the commltment seller wi]1 set d
just low enough to ensure that the borrower's marginal return to effort is at
least as great as the level needed to ensure a cholce of aI at ta0. That is,
the distortionary effect ot the loan interest rate ía elíminated by setting it
sufficiently low. Of course, at this low interest rate, the commitment seller
suffers an expected loss on the loan.18 To recoup its loss, the commitment
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seller charges a commitment fee g at t-0: this fee permits ít to exactly break
even on the loan commítment contract. However, the commitment fee has no
incentive effect because it is paid "up-front" and representa a"sunk cost" for
the borrower, i.e., it does not lmpact 1ts action choice. Thus, the borrower
chooses a1 and enjoys a first best level of expected utilíty. The second step
ís to understand why partial (inside) equity fínancing in conjunctton with a
spot loan is not as effective as a loan commitment. Note that a fixed rate
loan commitment pegs the loan interest rate at the same level regardless of the
riskless spot rate.19 Thus, St reduces the customer's repayment obllgatlon by
different percentages ín the low and high interest rate states. Specifically,
it provides a greater percentage reduction in the hlgh interest rate state.
And this ls the state in which the distortlonary effect of the loan interest
rate is the most severe with spot credit contracting. Partial equity
flnancing, on the other hand, reduces the borrower's repayment oblígation
evenly across both the low and the high ínterest rate states, which is less
ePficient. We next have the following observation.
COROLLARY 1: Theorem 1 holds even if the borrower faces no technological
quality uncertainty about íts project.
This observation is precisely the central result Sn B-T-U (1987). Thus,
our analysis in this sectíon generalizes the B-T-U (1987) results to a more
complex environment than the one consídered there.
IV. LOAN COMMITMEVTS WITH EX POST CONTRACT ENPORCEMENT PROBLENS A RAISON
D'ETRE FOR BANKS
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Por notatlonal ease, we will assuwe that, although type 2-A and type 2-B
agenta are observationally identical, they cnn be distinguished at a cost v-0.
Aasuming v~ 0 does little to alter the analysís. However, the possibility of
v~ 0 has so~e í~pllcatlons for the organizational for~ of the bank we
rationalize. These are discussed later.
A. The Contract Enforcement Problem
The optíon-like feature of a loan co~sit~ent i~plies that the commitment
aeller providea a subsidized loan when the borrower exercises the commitment.20
Thia creates an incentive for the seller to renege on its pro~íse to lend under
the commitment. Although we have assumed thus far that the cosmitment seller
must honor the commitment, in practice the commitment seller does have some
,1
leeway in determining whether or not to honor the commit~ent. In particular,
tf it can establísh that the borrower's financial condttion deteriorated
~aterially between the time of issue of the loan commitment and the time of
takedown, then it may be legally unencumbered from its obllgation. Of course,
there must be costs for the commitment seller Sf 7t refuses to honor the
commitment when the borrower's fínancial condition does not warrant it;
otherwise, the commitment would never be honored. These costs could be loss of
reputatíon, explicit legal damages, etc. It would be rather easy to show that
the comoitment will always be honored Sf we simply assuAe an exorbitantly high
cost for not honoríng tt. However, this has the effect of trivíalizing the ex
post contract enforcement proble~. Moreover, arbitrarily high penalties will
generally not be feasible. The issue of what constitutes an "appropríate"
penalty will be addressed shortly.
Under what circu~stances ia St reasonable to assuee, in the context of our
model, that the commitment seller could costlessly renege? One obvious
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circu~stance is the occurrence of state E4. In thls state, the borrower has a
negatlve NPV fro~ Lts capital investment alone (not taking the etfort
disutlllty, V(a1), Snto account) even if it had chosen aI at t-0.21 We assume
thnt if the borrower wants to exercise the commitment and the couitment seller
reneges in a state other than E4. then a costly but perfect ex nost audit can
be conducted by the courta to determíne the borrower's realized project payofC.
(We do not address the issue of who bears the audit cost incurred by the couri.
Assuming that this cost is borne by the party that loses the case only adds
~ore notation.) Because a borrower's type realization at t-1 is common
knowledge, an audit of the realized cash flow, conditíonal on nroiect success,
will permlt an exact inference of the borrower's action choice. (Recall that
the cash flow in the successful state is a determínistic function of the
borrower's type and Sts action cholce.) If the borrower is found to have
chosen al (in keeping with the "spirit" of the loan comnit~ent contract), then
the com~ltment seller must pay damages to the borrower. But íC a2 Ss detected,
then the com~itment seller can keep the comnitment Pee and pay nothíng to the
borrower. Note, however, that if the borrower Ss unsuccessful, its reallzed
cash flow is zero rezardless of its type and action choíce. Having observed
project failure. an audit of the cash Plow would be useless since it is common
knowledge that the cash flow is zero and noninformative about the agent's
action choice. (Direct observation of al 1s not possible.) The borrower nay
also optimally choose not to purchase the comiitment, ín which case the loan
commitment game ends with a zero payoff to the comsitment seller and depositora
at t-0. (In thís event, the borrower wíll choose a2 !n anticipation of using
spot credlt and ínsíde equity at t-1.)
In states E1 and E3, the borrower optimally decides to let the commitment
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expire unexercised. Thus, the only relevant state to focus on is E2. If state
E2 occurs and the commitment seller reneges, the borrower has two choices. It
can either do nothing or it can take legal action agaínst the bank. Since the
court will audit the ex post cash flow, we can assuoe, without loss of
Qenerality, that the borrower wili choose its legal actlon at t-2 after
observing its cash flow. A borrower which observes project success but had
chosen a2 at ta0 will optiaally decide to do nothing sínce it is ~ade worse off
by pursuing legal action. Also, a borower which observes project failure will
not sue. In elther case, the bank, which had invested the commitment fee in
the riskless asset ( as ln states E1, E3 and E4) and loaned its deposit funds to
a spot borrower who had purchased a commitment from some other bank at t-0. can
keep its revenues. The depositors are promised gRPRh ~ d if the project
succeeds and gRfRh íf it fails. Of course, a borrower which chose ai at t-0
and is successful at t~2 wíll want to sue a bank that reneges in state E2. In
this case, there are two questions. What wíll be the líkely outcome? And, tf
the borrower wins, what will be the penalty Smposed on the lender? :~ot being
legal experts, we feel somewhat ill-equipped to answer these questions.Z2
However, as economists we can ~nake assumptions that are consistent with
rational economic behavior by the courts. Since in state EZ the financial
condition of a borrower which chose al has not "materially deteriorated." the
lender has no justification for not honoring the commitment. Thus, we assume
that the borrower wil] win the law suit. The question of the "appropriate"
penalty is more difficult. Therefore, we will consider the most stringent
possible penalty and discuss the possible effects of a variety of penalty
structures. Note that all that the lender has at ts2 Ss the revenue collected
on the spot loan eade with the S1 of deposits it had available at t-1 plus a
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revenue ot gRfRh resulting from its comm7tment fee being invested in the
rlskless asset, plus lts shareholders' pro~ec[s. Slnce depositors are not
party to the lender's decision to renege on its com,itment, the courts are
unlikely to view as equitable a judgement that takes away as a penalty the
deposltors' clai~ against the bank's assets at t-2. Por simplícity, we assuee
deposítors' Punds are protected by legally binding "me-first" rules. However,
the rest of the lender's assets are confiscated as a penalty. This includes
the compounded value, gRfRh, of the fee revenue and the shareholders' projects.
Note that this leaves the bank's shareholders with nothine and thus constitutes
the stiffest penalty among those penalties that protect the depositors' claim.
The penalty collected Prom the lender wíll be paid to the commitment holder.
As in the other states, we assume that the lender will lend the depositors' S1
to a(risky) borrower Sn the spot market at tal. However, the promised payment
to the depositors at t-2 must be modified if they are to obtain the same
expected return as in ihe other states. This is because the commitment fee
revenue is lost when the lender is successfully sued and hence not ínvested in
the riskless asset to provide depositors a payoff of gRfRh in both the success
and failure states at t-2. Thus, we assume that the deposit contract
stipulates iwo different payoff rules, one for the case in which the lender is
successfully sued at [-2 and the other for the case ln whích it ls not. If the
lender is not successfully sued at t-2, then the depositors get gRfRh t ó if
the Dorrower to whom the lender loaned íts funds succeeds and gRfRh if that
borrower fails. If the lender ís successfully sued at t~2, then the depositors
geL gRfRh~D(al)1-1 i ó if the borrower to who~ the lender loaned its funds is
successful and zero if that borrower is unsuccessful. Table 2 summarízes the
payoffs to the commitment seller, the borrower and the depositors at t-2 in
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depositors at t-2 in atates E1, E3 and E4, and for the different strategies the
cos~itaent aeller could pursue. Table 2' presents this information for state
E2. These pnyoffa are for a- a1: thoae tor a- a2 can De nnalogously written.
In thls environwent, if a lender contracts with ~ust one loan comaitment
customer, then the penalty on the lender for not honoring the couitment
contract is that all of the tersinal wealth of the lender'a shareholders is
passed along to the commltment óolder. With multiple loan commitments,
however, some borrowers ~ay exercise their coasít~ents while others do not. If
the lender reneges on a subset of the commit~ents that are exercised, we assume
that successful legal action by those who sue will result in all of the
lender's equlty net of title transfer costs being distributed ~ro rata to the
plaintiffs. Thís makes sense because it provídes the courts wíth the saximum
feasible penalty that can be levíed on a"nonperforming" lender.
The force of these assumptions is that the depositors' expected return is
~ade independent of both the borrower's decisions of whether or not to take
down the commitment and whether or not to sue the bank for not honoring the
commitment in state EZ as well as the lender's decislon of whether or not to
honor the comnitment. This has the virtue of making the depositors' strategy
at t~0 independent of their beliefs regarding these actions of the borrower and
the lender. The only belief of relevance for the deposítors is regarding the
borrower's action choice since this choice affecta the probabilities with which
the depositors receive their various state-contingent payoffs. The equílibrium
concept we will adopt puts restrictions on th]s belief.
B Definítlon of Additíonal Terms and EQUilibriua
When the borrower can take an action at t-0 that the commitment seller
cannot observe and the co~mitment seller can adversely affect the borrower by
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choosing not to honor the commitment at t-1, beliefa that both parties hold at
the outset cruclally affect the equilibrium. It is, therefore, useful to adopt
an equílibrium concept ín which the explicit assígnment of belíefs guídes the
determínatíon of equilibriu~. Me use t11e Grossman and Perry (1986) "perfect
sequential equílíbriui" (PSE) concept, a refinement of the Kreps and Milson
(1982) "sequentlal equ111brium." This requires some additional terss, wh]ch
are defined in Appendix I. (Me focus on pure atrategy PSE).
A Competítive PSE With a Loan Conmitment (CPSELC): An updating rule for the
commítment seller and metastrategiea for the commitment seller, depositors and
the borrower form a competitíve PSE if
(i) all ot the metastrategies are sequentíally perfect;
(ii) the commitment seller's updating rule is credíble with respect to all the
metastrategíes:
(i11) the commitment seller earns zero expected proflt;
(iv) deposltors earn an expected return equal to the rískless rate of return,
regardless of the commitment seller's actions and the borrower's takedown
behavior; and
(v) there does not exist any other loan commitment contract with the
associated sequentially perfect metastrategies for all partíes concerned
and a credible updating rule for the commitment seller such that the
borrower en~oys a hígher expected utilíty with lt, the commitment seller
earns zero expected profit and the depositors obtain an expected return
equallíng the riskless rate.
C. Deflnition oP Bank
A bank !s defined as a coliection of two or more equityholders dealing
with at least one borrower and one depositor.
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A large bank is a collectton of many equityholdera dealing with many
borrowers and many depositors.
D A Loan Commitment es a Bilateral Credit Exchange: The Non-Bank Case
There are two cases to consider. Pirst, we could have a direct exchange
between a borrower and a deposltor, bypassing the lender. That ís, a borrower
could approach a depositor at t-0 and purchase a loan commltment. The
ditflculty wlth thia arrangement is that the depositor could collect the
commitment fee and simply proceed to consume its cash endowment of Rpl at t-0.
The commltment would then not be honored at t:l and no legal enforcement
iechanism could remedy the situation. Of course, the borrower could simply
approach a depositor directly for spot credit at tsl. But we have already
shown that a loan commitment produces a superior outcome. Thus, this approach
is inefficíent.
The other case Ss that of a bilateral contract at t-0 between an
individual commitment seller and a borrower. The advantage of having a
commitment seller intermediate between a borrower and a seller is that it can
acquire funds from a depositor at t-0 and thus prevent the depositor from
consuming ita endowment at t-0. Of course, incentives must be provided to the
commitment seller to induce ít to ensure that the commitment contract Ss
honored. Under this arrangement, the commitment seller promises to lend up to
S1 should the Dorrower wísh to take such a loan at t-1. The Punds to support
thís commitment are raised through a two-period CD as discussed earlier. To
analyze the equilibrium that results ln the game between the commitment seller,
the borrower and the depositors, we need to define each party's payoff in each
state of nature. Me will not 11st the depositors' payoff sínce our descríption
of the CD contract has that information.
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To understand each party's íncentives, we have an extensive for~ for this
Qame 1n PiYUre 2. Deposltors are excluded ín this sketch, for reasons that
will be apparent later. In this extensive for~, nature is treated as a passive
player. We refer to the borrower's decision to take down the loan commitment
as "x," its decision not to exerclse the loan coultment óut borrow in the spot
~arket as "y," and its decisíon to not invest at all (avoíd both con~itment
takedown and spot market borrowinQ) as "z." All of these decisions are ~ade at
t-1, conditional on the borrower haviny purchased the commltaent at t-0. The
borrower's decision to purchase the loan commitment at t-0 is referred to as
"A" and íts decísion to plan to borrow !n the spot market as "s." Payoffs are
índícated as usual at the terminal node. The fírst term in any payoff pair Ss
the borrower's expected utility (assessed over its net payoff at t-2) and the
second term is the commitment seller's expected wealth at t-2. Both
expectatLons are assessed at t-1, i.e., after E has been realízed but prior to
the realization of the random cash flow from the borrower's project. Suppose
first that the borrower has chosen a1. Then Sn state Q1, the borrower does not
exercise the commitment and goes to the spot credit market. Let Ui be the
borrower's expected utility in this case. (Our notational convention is to
denote the borrower's expected utility by U~ where i denotes action ai and ,J
denotes state Ej; the only exception is when a com~itment is taken down, in
which case ~ Ss replaced by c.) The commltment seller lends its deposit funds
(f1) Sn the spot credit market and i ts expected payoff is zero fros the loan
and S in total. In state EZ, the borrower exercises the conmitment. If the
commitment seller decides to honor its commit~ent ( a decísíon denoted by "h"),
the borrower's expected utility ís U1 and the commitaent seller's expectedc
payoff is S. If the comsltment seller decides not to honor the commiteent (a
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decision denoted by "n"), and the co~nitment holder's (borrower's) project ís
successful, it will sue and win. On the other hand, if the co~itaent holder's
project fails, it will not sue. Thus, if the coA~itnent seller reneges, the
con~itment holder's payoff depends on whether its own project is successful.
Moreover, since the (punítive) damages it can collect froa the comsitnent
seller depend on the success~failure of the project of the apot Dorrower the
comnitaent seller loaned to at t-1, the coasitnent holder's payoff is also a
function of the realization of that uncertainty. (We assume, wlthout loss of
generality, that the danages collected by the comaitment holder when it
successfully sues are unavailable to the deposítors who give thís borrower spot
credit at t~l.) Thus, if the commitment holder as well as the spot borrower
are successful, the former gets a net payoff of
X(a1,G) - Rh[P(al)]-1 - V(al) - gRfRh
a{gRfRh - Rh[P(al)l-1 - gRfRh[P(al)1-1 - d~ S~}.
where the ter~ in the curly brackets represents the damages collected by the
commitment holder. Similarly, if the commitment holder's project is successful
but the spot borrower's is not, the forAer gets a net payoff of
X(a1,G) - Rh[P(al)~-1 - V(al) - gRt h`(gRfRh ' S'}.
where once again damages are ín the curly brackets. If Lhe commitment holder's
project is unsuccessful, íts net payoff is - V(al) - gRfRh, regardless of the
spot borrower's project payoff realization. In state E3, there is no loan
commitment takedown, but the borrower acquires spot credit and invests. Its
expected utility is U3. The commitment seller's expected payoff is S. In
state Q4, the borrower does not invest and experíences an expected utility of
Uá. Again, the commitment seller's expected payoff is S.
How suppose the borrower chooses a2 at t-0 and.yet decides to purchase a
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loan com~itment, l.e., it Almics a borrower choosíng aI, In state E1, there is
no comAltment takedown as the borrower acquires spot credit and experiences an
expected utility of Ui. The commitment seller's expected payoff Ss S. In
state EZ, the borrower will exerclse the coe~ítwent. If ihe cow~iteent seller
honors !t, the borrower's expected utility is U~ and the con~ítment seller'a
expected payoff is 5.23 If the comwit4ent seller refuses to honor the
commitment, we have already established that the borrower will not sue. Thus.
it will seek spot credit yieldine an expected utility of U2, The commitment
seller's expected payoff is p(aI)[r(al~Rh) - ó) f S. In state E3, there is no
commitment takedown as the borrower acqulres spot credit. The borrower's
expected utility is U3 and the comnitment seller's expected payoff Ss S. In
state Q4,the borrower does not invest and experiences an expected utility of
~á. The commitment seller's expected payoff is S.
In FiAUre 3 we have sketched a"condensed" extensive fors for this game.
This extensive form is drawn only for state E2 because the commitment seller's
metastrategy has to be evaluated Por each Q and it is relevant only for E2
Payoffs are indicated at the terminal nodes wlth the first term representing
the borrower's expected utility and the second tera the commitment seller's
expected payoff. For the borrower, however, we now write its expected utility
in t-2 dollars with the expectation taken also across E realizations. This
expectation ís made conditional on ai E{a1, a2} and on each of the bank's
decíslons, n and h. We thus have the borrower's expected utllíty assessed at
t-0, which is when it is choosing its action. However, expectation of the
comaitsent seller's payoff is taken at t~l, condí[ional on Q2. This is because
the commitment seller knows E when St is deciding whether to honor the
commitment. Thus, even though the extensive Por~ focuses on the payoffs to the
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two partles in state E2, the borrower's payoff is stated ín ter~s of its
expected utility príor to the realization of f whereas the coswit~ent seller's
payoff is stated ín teros of Sts expected payoff conditional on E2.
we now present explicít expressions for
(1 E {1. 2}).2q
the payoffs stated ín Figure 2
Ui - P(ai) X(ai.G) - V(ai) - gRfRA - RQ P(ai)[P(al)}-1
1 ~ p(a ) X(a G)Uc i i' - V(ai)
U3 - p(ai) X(a1.8) - V(ai)
Uq ` - V(ai) - gRfRh
gRfRh - P(al)d
gRfRQ - P(ai)RA(P(al))
UZ ~ p(al) X(a1.G) - V(al) - gRfRh - Rh
UZ - - V(a2) - gRfRh.
The payoffs stated in Figure 3 are eade explicit below.
uh z e w ui t w[1-o] u~ t[1-w] e u3 t[1-w)(1-elua
'`Y P(al) Xla1.G) t(1-~3'] A P(al) X(a1.B) -~F'[1-61 P(al)d







U~ ~ Uh -~Y[1-0)L{r(a1~Rh) - d} p(al){1-P(al)} P(al)S'] (12)
u2 - s w o2 t~(i-el u2 t[i-~r] e u2 . ( i-w)(i-e]o2h 1 c 3 q
`~ P(a2) X(a2, G) t(1-~] 9 P(a2) Xla2. B) -~Y[1-9) P(a2)d
- gRf - V(a2) - 6 RQ Ple2) [P(al)l-1.
U~ - Uh - w[1-Al P(a2)[r(a1~Rh) - d].
Now. define
S' E (1-p(al)l[r(a1~Rh) - ó](1-p(al)`i~(1-A)RhRfl).
(13)
(14)
where d i s defined explicitly in terms of exogenous parameters in (A-12) in the
Appendix. Note that 0 ~ S} ~ m. Henceforth, we shall assuwe that
S E (0, S').
With these preliainarles, we can now state the following result.
(PR-6)
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THEOREM 2: Mhen there is a bilateral loan commitment contract between an
individual comAitment seller and a Dorrower, the com~itment seller will renege
on its promise. Thus, the only CPSELC involves the loan conaitsent contract
not being accepted by the borrower.
Mlth a bilateral credít exchange, then, we have market breakdown. The
reason is that the commitment seller is not able to nake a credíble promise to
lend under the commltment in states in which the borrower wishes to take it
down. This happens despíte the avallability of legal recourse to the borrower
and the possible impositíon of a penalty on the commitment seller for
unjustifiable failure to perfori. Legal recourse is ineffective as a
disciplining mechanism because the ~axímum legal penalty that can be ímposed on
the commitment seller ís less than the gain to the commitment seller from
reneging. To see why this is so, note that the commitment fee is set at t-0 to
equal the expected present value of the subsidy provided to the borrower under
the com~itment. Thus, once the borrower finds itself in the state Sn which
takedown is profitable ( state EZ), the subsidy on the loan exceeds the
commitment fee value at that point. By not honoring the commitment -- and
lendíng in the spot market i nstead -- the commitment seller can gain if it is
forced to relínquish all of i ts termínal wealth, conditional upon successful
legal action by the borrower. Of course, this result rests on S not being too
high. Thís ís the reason for the parametric restriction on S. Our purpose is
to show that even when S ís not high enough to ensure contract enforceability
wíth an individual commítment seller, lt can do so with a bank.
E. Loan CommitmF~::ts Issued by a Bank
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Perhaps the sí~plest resolution of the contract enforceability probleo is
for the com~it~ent seller to be a bank with N(? 2) equityholders, 1 borrower
and 1 depositor. With N sufficiently large, the bank will honor its commitment
since the value of Sts lost projects will exceed the gain fco~ not honoring the
co~witeent. However, if v ~ 0, this resolution is inefficient relative to an
alternative we wlll discuss shortly. The reason is that verification costs --
required to distingulsh type 2-A agents fro~ type 2-B agents -- are borne by
the borrower in equilibrium, and having vany equityholders per borrower
increases the per capita íncidence of verification costs.
Consider now a large bank that sells (fixed rate) loan commitments to a
countable infinity of borrowers with independent k's. This bank has exactly as
many depositors and equityholders as it does borrowers. Thus, the per capita
incldence of verification costs will now only be v. Assume, for simplicity.
that v~0. A1l borrowers start out being identical at tLO, with each assessing
a probability of ~Y of realizing k~G. Since there is a countable infinity of
borrowers, throughout this analysis we consider the fractíons of "good" and
"bad" borrowers, whlch are just ~Y and 1-~Y respectively, and write payoffs in
per capita terms.25 Green (1982) provides a rigorous justifícation for this
procedure.
As in Boyd and Prescott (1986), our bank Ss "large" in the sense that it
has a countable infinity of equityholders and deals with a countable infinity
of depositors and borrowers, and "small" in the sense that ít has no monopoly
power. The latter is achieved by assuning that the fraction of all agents that
deals with any bank is S.
When a bank deals with sultiple loan consit~ent buyers at tz0, the deposit
contract negotiated at t~0 must be modiffed to reflect the multíplicity of
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commltment buyers. To ensure comparablllty between the non-bank case analyzed
prevíously and the bank case, we will keep the spirit oP the deposit contract
unchanged.
To understand the structure of the deposit contract, note first that it is
no longer convenient to refer to depositors' payoffs ín states ~1 through q4.
This is because these states are borrower-speciflc and we have aany borrowers.
We will, therefore, refer to depositors' payofts in the high spot riskless rate
state and the low spot rískless rate state. At t~l, if R- R~, no borrower
takes down its commitment. The bank thus lends all of its deposlt funds Co a
countable infinity of distinct borrowers in the spot market. In a eanner
analogous to the non-bank case, depositors are promised r(a1~RA) t gRfRR on
every borrower that has a successful project realization (and hence repays its
loan) and gRfRR on every failure. We w111 work once again with the fractions
of successful and unsuccessful borrowers, which are just p(al) and 1-p(al)
respectively, and write payoffs in per capita tecros. At t~l, if R~ Rh, then
borrowers who have k-G wíll take down theír commitments; the fraction of such
borrowers is ~. The rest of the borrowers let their commitments expire
unexercised. The deposit funds made available by such borcowers are loaned out
in the spot market by the bank to other borrowers who purchased commitments at
t-0. This seans that if the bank honors all of its commitments which are taken
down, the depositors get 6 t gRfRn on every commitment borrower whose project
is successful and gRfRh on every commitment borrower whose project fails. For
every spot borrower the bank deals with, depositors get r(a1~Rh) t gRfRh if the
borrower's project succeeds and gRfRh if it fails. On a per capita basis,
thecefore, depositors' (expected) payoff is gRfRh t p(al)[Wó t{1-W} r(a1~Rh)j'
Nhereas the bank's expected payoff is S.
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Before for~alízing the case of banks, it Ss useful to understand the
intuition behind why a bank can help restore credibility. Let N be the number
of loan com~itsent sellers ( equityholders) in the coalition we call a bank.
Let Nt be the number of loan commitaents taken down, and let Ng ~ Nt be the
number of loan commitwents on which the bank reneges. Let u' be the
lncremental per capita gain to the bank fro~ reneging as opposed to not
reneging, assuning the borrower has chosen al. we can now write u' as
u' - ;I - S,
where
;1 m[1-p(al)]Nr NrN-1 [R - 6p(al) - gRfRhP(al) r S] - S.
Now, if the bank is very large (N y m) and reneges on all its loan commitments.
thenNlim [1-p(ai)]Nr - 0. Thus,,~l~ ;I - 0, iaplying u' --S. On the other
hand,rif a very large bank reneges on only one loan commitment, then
NrN-1 - N-1, and thus, lim ;1 - 0. Once again, u' --S. In words, this means
N~
that, as long as there is a finite nuober of reneged loan commitments, there is
a nonzero probability that the bank will escape legal punishment. flowever, the
for~ation of a bank affects the incentives to renege. As the bank reneges on
more and more loan commitments, the probability of going unpunished diminishes.
This can be offset by reneging on fewer and fewer loan commitments, but as bank
gets larger, the profits from reneging are pro-rated over a greater numbec of
equityholders. In elther case, the per capita gains from reneging vanish with
increasing bank size. Although for any finite N, there will generally be an
optimal Nr, we will assume that, if the bank reneges, it will renege on all its
commitments. This does not sacrifice such since we focus on an infinitely
large bank for which there ís no optimal Nr. Note, however, that an infinitely
large bank is unnecessary to establish credibility. It is clear that u' ~ 0
will generally be attained for a finite N.
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Now suppose R- Rh at t-1 and the bank refuses to honor any of the
commítments taken down. Consequently. lt wlll lose all of its equíty,
including the commitment fee revenue, if any con~itment holder successfully
sues. Moreover, all of the depositors' funds will be lnvested ín spot loans.
For depositors to obtain the saee (expected) payoff as in the case in which the
bank honors ita commitments, the deposít contract must be modified as follows.
If at least one commitment holder successfully sues, then on a fraction ~ of
the spot loans that are successfully repaíd -- these are the spot loans that
"replace" the loans that should have been nade to the commitment holders who
exercíse -- depositors get 6~ gRfRh(Wp(al)j-1 per loan, whereas on the
remaining successfully repaid spot loans, depositors get r(a1~Rh) per loan.
Depositors get nothing on a loan that is not repaid. If no commítment holder
sues, then depositors get ó ~ gRfRh on a fraction ~ of all successfully repaid
spot loans, r(a1~Rh) ~ gRfRh on the remaining successfully repaid spot loans,
and gRfRh on a loan that is not repaid. Once again we see that depositors' per
capita (expected) payoff is gRfRh t p(al)(~ó .{1-W}r(a1~Rh)) in the limit as
N~ which is exactly the same as it is when the bank honors its commitments.
Thus, the structure of the deposit contract in the bank case mimics that
in the non-bank case. The only diPference is that an adjustment is made !n the
bank case to allow for the possibility of only a fraction of the bank's
comsltment customers exerclsing their commitment optíons. Table 3 lísts the
depositors' and the bank's payoffs in different states for alternative bank
strategies. We can now state our final result.
THEOREM 3: There exísts a CPSELC involving banks, each dealing with a
countable intinity of borrowers, such that each borrower purchases a loan
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cossitaent at ts0 and choosea al and each bank honors every comaitrsent at t-1.
This theore~ sakes two key points. Pirat, n(large) bank can resolve the
ex post contract enforceability proble~ that plaguea a bilateral credit
transactlon involving an individual lender and a aingle Dorrower. This is
despite the fact that a borrower has recourse to the aaee legal punisha~ent
~echanis~ when dealing with a bank that reneges on Sts co~~itsent as it does
when dealing with an índividual lender. In both cases, the eaxisue penalty
that can be in~posed on the lender is the loss of all of its terminal equity.
The difference between the two cases, of course, lies in the effectiveness of
the legal punishment mechanisn. This effectiveness increases wíth the size of
the commitment seller and attains its naximum for an infinítely large bank.
The second key point of this theoreA is that we have an economic rationale
for the existence of a bank. With contract enforceability problems,
lntermediation serves to bring borrowers and lenders (depositors) together for
contractual credit exchange. Because bilateral contracts suffer from lack of
credibilíty and the legal systen is ineffective in restoring incentives to
honor contracts, a non-organizational, earket-mediated equillDrium fails to
exist. This potential market failure creates a natural impetus for the
emergence of organizations to Sntermediate between individual borrowers and
lenders in a 0anner that assures credibility. Organizations can be "trusted"
to honor contracts that individuals cannot.
It is useful to compare our result on bank exlstence with the contemporary
literature; examples are Boyd and Prescott (1986). Diamond (1984), Ra~nakrishnan
and Thakor (1984) and Millon and Thakor (]985). In Boyd and Prescott, banks
arise because they are the n~ost efficlent producers of costly information
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subsequent to contractíng in an environment ín whích private information exists
prior to contracting. In the remaining three papers, intermedlation causes
expected contracting costs to be lowered i n environments ínvolving
informational constraints. Moreover, Boyd and Prescott, Diamond, and
Ramakrishnan and Thakor fínd that inPinítely large intermediaries are optimal,
whereas Millon and Thakar rationalíze lntermediaries of finite size. All four
papers focus on spot market transactions i n síngle period models.
There are two important distinctions Detween this literature and our work.
Pirst, the intermediaries in these papers do not sell contíngent claíms like
loan commitments. Thus, they do not permit an understanding of the role of
depository financíal ínstitutíons in the creation and sale of credlt options,
forward credit contracts and other similar ínstruments. Second, they all
assume that contracts are enforceable ex post. By contrast, we have assigned a
pivotal role to contract enforceabilíty probiems and have thus highlighted a
pcevíously unexplored function of financial intermediaríes, namely, the
provision of credibility assurance.
V. COYCLCDING THOUGHTS
We have taken a close look at a commitment seller's incentives to honor
its loan commitments. Although thls contract enforceability hazard has been
repeatedly acknowledged ín the llterature, ours is the first paper to analyze
its ímplicatíons.2fi Our principal findings are listed below.
(i) Loan commítments are shown to serve an economíc function in an
environment characterized by universal risk neutralíty, takedown
uncertaínty and random Puture spot rates. In particular, a loan
commitment is even more efficient than inside equity in resolving moral
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hazard arísing fro~ an unobservable borrower action choice.
(íi) A loan coesit~ent can be econoeically valuable even Mhen its seller's
incentíve to renege is explicitly allowed for.
(111) A new econo~ic rationale is provided for the exiatence of a bank.
Because of contract enforceability problems, an lndividual lender can not
~ake a credible proaise to honor its loan con~lt~ent. Thus, a non-
organízatlonal loan com~itsent ~arket cannot exíst. In such an economy,
banks can arise as institutions to assure credibility by restoring
contract enforcement incentives.
A callous observer ~ight say that contract enforceability is not a
particularly compelling Sssue to focus on because ínstances of banks reneging
are rare. This misses the point, however. Perhaps the reason why loan
conAitments are generally honored is that they are issued by banks.
It should also be noted that the way we have structured the CD coniract is
not the only way to give depositors an expected return equal to the riskless
rate. The contract we have employed has the useful property that gains from
reneging accrue to the commitment seller and the depositors' expected payoff is
independent of the commitment seller's strategy. It is possible to construct
alternative coniracts under which the commitment seller gains nothing from
reneging because depositors capture all the gains. In this case the contract
enforcement problee will resurface if the coAmitnent seller is viewed as a
~utual in which depositors can exert "ownership" pressures on the commitment
seller to act ín a way that ~axímizes the depositors' ex post gains. Thus, the
specific details of the deposit contract are inessential to our results.
Moreover, the penalty we have assumed wili be imposed on a nonperforming
coositment seller is the ~axiou~ penalty. There are at least two other penalty
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structures that bankers believe are plausible. One is that the bank would be
asked to return all the commitment fees. TRe other is "trebel damages," under
wh1cR the bank would be asked to refund three tlmes the Cees collected. In
both cases, the penalty is less severe than what we have considered. Thís
means that the íncentive to renege will be even stronQer for an indivídual
commitment seller, creating a further impetus for the emergence of a(large)
bank. 0! course, it is possíble that the penalty ís so weak that even a large
bank has an Sncentive to renege. However, we have examined the weakest penalty
structure -- refund of all commitment fees -- and found that a bank has an
Sncentive to Ronor its commitments. Details of the analysis are available upon
request.
An interesting feature of the banks in our model is that they lend through
loan commitments and also directly in the spot market. This is consístent with
what we observe. Moreover, they borrow long and lend both long and short.
This suggests that one may be able to develop the model further to address
questions such as maturity mismatching and asset-liability mix. Although there
is not yet sufficient structure in the model to do this, the machinery seems to
be in place. An appealing aspect of such an exercíse ís that one could analyze
these "conventional" issues in a framework in which the bank has a reason to
exist that aríses endogenously in the sodel.
Erpliclt modeling of reputation would be another way to go in future
research. we have ignored the role of seller reputation in a repeated setting
as a mechanísm for contract enforcement. It seems likely that some of the
ídeas in thís paper can be exploited to show that banks value reputation more
than individual commitment sellers, suggesting another reason for the emergence




1. Some recent papers have explained why loan commitments exist in a riskneutral setting. These are Berkovitch and Greenbauw (1986), Greenbaum,Kanatas and Vennezia (1987), Kanatas (1987), Boot, Thakor and Udell (1987)and Thakor (1987). Of these, the Boot, Thakor and Udell paper is the sostclosely related to ours and it ia discussed later in this section. Themost important difference between those papers -- including Boot, Thakorand Udell -- and ours is that we endogenously explain why the bank Sssuingthe coultment exists, whereas they take the bank as being exoeenouslvgiven. The Dank Aas no reason to exist that ia endogenously explained inthose papers.
There ís also a loan couitment paper by Jaies (1981) which assumesthat banks and borrowers are risk neutral. However, that paper does noicontain a formal justifícation for why loan commitments exist.
2. Por exaaple, Thakor-and Udell (1987) assume that borrowers are riskaverse, whereas Melnlck and Plaut (1986) assume that banks are riskaverse. The princlpal ob~ective in Thakor and Udell is, however, not taexplain why commitments exíst. The transactions cost argunent ís a ratherpopular one ín justifications of loan comiitments (see, for Snstance,Mason (1979)).
3. Even floating rate commitments have a comnitment rate that is partiallyrigld. For example, "príme plus" commitments hold Pixed the add-on to theprioe that detersines the customer's borrowing rate under the commitment.See Canpbell (1978).
4. See Greenbaum, Soss and Thakor (1985).
5. See, for example, Stiglítz and Weiss (1983, 1987).
6. See Thakor (1982) and Thakor, Hong and Greenbau~ (1981).
7. Partlal deposit insurance can be íntroduced without much effect.
8. Relaxing this assumption does little to alter the analysis qualitatively.
9. Thts random cash flow !s the outcome of the borrower's action choice att~0 and its capltal investment at t-1.
10. Thus, we lgnore other credit instruments like collateral that may haveincentive effects. See Besanko and Thakor (1987) and Bester (1985) foranalyses of the incentive effects of collateral in a pre-contract privateinformation setting.
11. The analysís of loan commitment optimality then becomes a oatter ofascertaining whether, in a uníversally risk neutral economy, there ls anystrictly positive value to diverting some of the borrower's equity topayment of the commltnent tee.
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]2. A requirewent of the equiltbriuw is that the bank's beliefs about ai
coinclde with the borrower's choíce of a. Of course, these beliefs wíll
trivially coincide with the true action choíce when ni 1a freely
observable ex post to the bank.
13. This weans that the ex post ínforwation set of the borrower ís partitioned
finer than that of the bank.
14. One would require that none of the ex post return is observable to the
bank and the borrower can divert it for its own consuwption without bank
detection. Thia makes an equlty contract infeaslble. However, aince the
. bank can observe whether the project succeeded. it can penalize a borrower
who defaults followín~ project auccesa. A aufficiently laree penalty will
deter successful borrowers from defaultínQ. Of course, penalties are not
feasible when there ís project fnilure; the borrower has no funds with
which to pay the penalty.
15. The inequality below should not be interpreted as saying that the borrower
pays a loan interest rate when it cowpletely self-finances. However, ín
light of ( 4), we know that the product p(ai)r(a1~R ) equals R. Thus, the
terws that appear as interest payments are to be í~terpreted ~erely as the
borrower's opportunity costs of not investine in the rískless asset at the
spot rates preva111nQ in those states.
16. See also Chan and Thakor (1987).
17. Th1s also makes sense because, Qiven our assuwptions, all borrowers
purchase loan commitments at t-0.
18. If it did not, there would be no moral hazard with spot lending.
19. Our result extends to variable rate loan cowwitments too sínce such
comwitments involve sowe fixity in the borrowinQ rate.
20. This observation is not new. It has been wade repeatedly ín the loan
comwitments literature. See, for example, Boot, Thakor and Udell (1987),
Campbell (1978), and Thakor, Hong and Greenbauw (1981).
21. Note that we view the realizatlon of the atates E1, i E{1, 2, 3, 4) as
beine spectfic to the bank's loan commitment customer. Since a Yiven spot
riskless interest factor realization, R 1 E{R , R j, is the same for all
borrowers, when the loan commítment cusiomerAfln~s Stself in states E1 and
E3, the spot riskless rate for all borrowers in the econowy Ss R.
Similarly, when the loan commitment customer finds itself in sta~e E4. the
spot riskless rate for all borrowers ís Rh . Note that since the k's are
(paírwise) independent across borrowers, ihere wlll be borrowers who find
thewselves in states other than E even when our bank's loan commitaent
custower fínds Stself in state E44 Thus, these borrowers may wish to
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borrow ín the spot sarket even though the bank's loan comnitment customer
does not wish to invest at all.
22. Legal precedents are not of ~uch help here since banks hardly ever renege
on foraal loan comnituents when the borrower's financial condition is
"acceptably" sound and the bank itself is solvent and financially capable
of ~eeting íts copeitnent obligation. Thus. practice see~s to bear out
what we eventually characterize as an equílíbríu~.
23. Given the nature of the deposit contract, the expected loss that occurs in
this case is absorbed by the depositors. This is why deposltors' beliefs
nbout the borrower's action choice are íwportant.
24. The expressions below make expliclt our earlier state~ent that a borrower
who purchases a loan commitment at t-0 can borrow in the spot market at
t-1 as Sf St had chosen aí at t-0, regardless of its actual action choice
at ta0.
25. See Boyd and Prescott (1986) for a s1411ar approach.
26. Kanatas (1987) introduces the possíbility of the commitment seller
reneging, but he does not endogenize the seller's Sncentives to renege.
Moreover, he does not address the bank existence issue.
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APPEVDIX I
Discussion of TerAS Used In Definitíon o[ EQUillbrlui
Metastrategy: A setastrateQy for a glven player prescribes for each of that
player's inforaatton aets and beliefs over that Snforaation set the action that
the player wili take. For the cow~it~ent seller !n our ~odel, the ~etastrategy
at t-1 is whether to honor the coailt~ent or not, conditional on the observed
reallzatlon of E E ti and on a particular belief about the Dorrower's actian
cholce at t:0. This ~etastrategy !s specifted for each posslble realization of
~ and each possible belief about ai, Note that the borrower's observed
takedown behavíor at t-1 is a nonlnformative sígnal to the comsitment seller
about the borrower's action choice. This is because in each of the E1 states,
the borrower's takedown behavior ís the same, regardless of whether it chooses
aí or a2 (see Table 1.) Por the borrower, we specify a~etastrategy
conditional on the assuaption that the offered loan com~itment contract Ss
accepted by the borrower at t-0. We then also study a"generalized
metastrategy" for the borrower which Ss not conditional upon acceptance of the
loan coAUitment Dy the borrower at t-0 and thus endogenizes the borrower's
decisíon regarding acceptancelre~ectíon oP the loan commitment at t~0.
Pinally, the depositors' ~etastrategy specifies how they wlll price the two-
period CD, conditíonal upon their beliefs regarding the action the borrower
will choose and the comnitment honoring strategy of the commitment seller.
Updatine Rule: Since neither the borrower nor the depositors have an
opportunity to update their beliefs, we can confine attention to the way the
coaaitaent seller updates its bellefs. An updating rule for the comsitment
seller sisply specífies the belíef the coowitment seller has at each of its
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infor~ation sets as a function of Sts beliefs in the past. The com~itment
seller in our model starts out with some belief about the action the borrower
will choose príor to oftering St a commiteent contract and then revises this
belief based on whether or not the borrower accepts the contract. (There are
two other ~portunities for the commitment seller to revise íts belief. One is
following the borrower's takedown decision at t~l. However, as indicated
earlier, takedown behavior is nonínformative about ai, Thus, the lender will
not revise its bellef. The other opportuníty is after observing the borrower's
decision of whether or not to sue subsequent to reneging by the lender in state
E2, While thls observation is informative -- only a borrower which chose ai
sues -- the lender has no decision left, making its belief revision is
írrelevant.)
Seguential Perfection: A~etastrategy and updating rule for the commitment
seller are sequentially perfect Sf, at each informatíon set and for each
belief, the metastrategy prescribes the usual best response.
Credible Uadatinz: An updating rule for the commitment seller is credible Sf
the belief assigned by the updating rule at each of the commitment seller's
information sets ís "consistent." Consistency Ss essentially a restriction on
how the commitment seller revlses its beliefs. Upon observing the borrower's
decision of whether or not to accept the comaítmeni, the comsiteent seller
should revíse its belief about the borrower's action choice in such a way that
íf the con~mitment seller then decides to honorlnot honor the comaitment in
accordance with (the metastrategy prescribed by) this revised belief, then the
borrower is better off having chosen the action the commitment seller believes




PROOP OP LEMMA 1: We will first prove that the allocatlon described in the
lensa is indeed a Nash equilibriu~ (N.E.). A necessary conditlon for thís to
be a N.E. is
P(a2) E Pr(E ~ Ei)[X(a2, k(E1))-r(a2~R(fi))~ - V(a2)E1E 2
P(a1) E Pr(Q - Ei)[X(a1. k(E1))-r(a21R(Ei))~ - Vla1)
E1E 2
where k(~i) aeans the realízation of k corresponding to the realization ~1 and
R(Ei) means the realization of R correspondinQ to the realization ~1. Recall
that r(a1~Rj) is defined Sn (4). A comparison of (A-1) with (PR-2) now reveals
that (A-1) is a weaker condltion. Thus, this equllibriu~ is supported by the
bank believing the borrower has chosen a2 and the borrower believing that the
bank will extend credit to it at r(a2~RA) iC R- RA and at r(aZ(Rh) if R- Rh.
Both beliefs are rationalized in equllibrium. Moreover, the bank earns zero
expected profit and, given this system of beliefs, there is no otner contract
that can eake the borrower strictly better ofC. All that remains to be shown
in order to establish this as a N.E. is that the borrower's expected utility is
non-negative. Using (PR-3), the borrower's expected utility can be written as
P(a2I{9i'[X(a2, G)-r1a2IR~)]'9[1-W][X(a2, B)-rla2~RA)]}-V(a2). (A-2)
Pro~ (PR-S) we see that (A-2) is strictly posítive. Thus, this is a N.E.
Verification that this yields a lower expected utility than first best noN
follows directly fro~ (PR-1').
Note that any N.E. involving the bank ]ending at r1a2~R~) iP R~ R~ for
one j E[h, A} and rationing otherwise is strictly Pareto doeinated by Lhe N.E.
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above. Thus, we need not consider those N.E. Also, "~ixed action" contracts,
lnvolvíng r(alIRA) it R- R~ and r(ajlRh) if R- Rh, with ai f nj, can never be
N.E.
Thua, the only candldates for N.E. that we need to exa~lne are those
involving (i) the bank charging r(al)RA) !t R- RR and rntioning otherwise and
(ii) the bank charging r(a11Rh) if R- Rh and rationing otherwise. The reason
why these are the only two re~aining candldates is twofold. Pirst, (PR-2)
precludes a N.E. in which the bank charges r(a11RR) if R- RA nnd r(a11Rh) Sf
R- Rh, And second, an allocation involving the bank chargíng r(a1(RA) if
R- Rh or r(ailRh) if R- RA can never be a N.E. in the spot credit aarket
because it would entail the bank ~aking either a positive expected profit or a
negative expected profit.
Now suppose the bank charges r(a11RA) if R- R~ and rations otherwise.
Since the borrower nust correctly anticipate this credit policy ín equllibriua.
it will assess its expected utility fron choosing al as
Plal){e~[X(a1,G) - C(a1~R~)] ~ A[1-W][X(e1.B) - r(alIRQ)])-V(al) (A-3)
and its expected utility fros choosing a2 ns
P(a2){Ai'[X(a2.G) - rlal)R~)] ~ A[1-`YJ[Xla2.B) - rla11RA)l}-V(a2).(A-4)
Note now that (PR-3) fmplies that X(a2, G) - r(a11Rh) ~ 0 whereas
X(a~,G) - r(a11Rh) ~ 0. Moreover, X(al, B) - r(a11Rh) ~ X(a2, B) - r(a1~Rh)'
Using these observatlons in conjunction with (PR-2) iaplies that (A-4) strictly
exceeds (A-3). Thus, the bank's bellef about the borrower's actíon choice is
not rationallzed and this ia not a N.E.
Next suppose the bank charges r(a11Rh) if R- Rh and ratíons otherwise.
The borrower's expected utility froa choosíng al ís
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P(al){fi~]~(X(al. G)-rlailRh)] ~ [1-9][1-w][X(al, g)-r(a1IRh))l
- V(al). (A-5)
gut fro~ (PR-3), X(al, g) - r(ai~Rh) ~ 0. Now fro~ (PR-4), ít follows that the
expression !n (A-5) Ss stríctly negatíve. This violates a requlreAent of the
equilibrlui. Hence, thís is not a N.E. either. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF THEOREM 1: Define ~ E(0, 1) aa the fractíon of the investment that
the borrower self-finances in conjunction with spot borrowing. Given the S1
required investnent, ~ can also be defined as the dollar anount of equity
Snvested in the project by the borrower. The remaining investment, S1 -~, is
Pinanced with a bank loan. To resolve the aoral hazard proble~ in thís case
-- ensure that ai is chosen -- one should select ~ such that the following
incentive compatib111ty condition is Aet
~{~p(al)X(a1.G) t 9[1-~]P(al)X(a1,B) - A RA - W(1-A)Rh - V(al)}
~ {1-~}(A ~p(al)a2 . [1-9I~P(al)a3 t A(1-~]p(al)a4 - V(al)}
~{6 `PP(a2)X(aZ,G) ~ 6(1-WIP(a2)Xla2.B) - A.RA
t{1-i.i}{A WP(a2Ia5 f A[1-~]P(a21a6 - V(a2)]
where a2 a X(a1.G) - r(a1~R~)
A3 s X(a1,G) - r(a11Rh)
a4 aF X(a1,B) - r(a1~RA)
as ~ X(aZ,G) - r(a1~RR)
as a X(a2,B) - r(ai~RR).




V(a2) - V(a1) ~`W(a1) X(e1,G) ~ 6[1-~)P(a1) X(a1.B)
- 6 Wp(a2) X(a2,G) - A[1-~]p(a2) X(a2,B) - 6p(a1)r(a1)
- [1~]W D(a1) r(a11Rh) ~ 9P(a2) r(a11RQ)
~ (A-7)
~{ - 6[D(a1) - p(a21]r(a1(RA)},
which i~plles that
~ ~ {V(ai) - V(a2) - a7){9LP(ai) - p(a2)]r(a11RR))-1 (A-S)
where
a~ s p(a1){~vx(a1.G) . A(1-~]X(a1.e) - er(a11RR) -[1~]~ r(a11Rh))
- P(a2)(WX(a2.G) t [1-W] X(aZ,B) - r(a1~R~))9
Now suppose the borrower purchases a loan coaAitsent and pays a commitment
fee of g at tz0. The incentive conpatibility condition in this case is
p(a1)(e ~2 4 e[1-w]a4 ~~(1-e)[x(a1, G) - a]} - v(a1)
~ (A-9)
p(a2){s ~a5 ~ e[1-w]as f w(1-el[x(a2, c) - s]) - v(a2).
where 6 E ( R~[p(a1)]-1, Rh[p(a1)]-1) is the (fixed) loan commitment ínterest
factor. Note that, with this loan comeitment interest factor, the borrower
will exercise the commitment only wh.en R- Rh. The commltment expires
unexercised when R- RR because the customer can borrow at a lower rate,
RA[p(a1)]-1, in the spot earket. It is important to note that lenders in the
spot credit market are willing to lend to the borrower under the belief that
the borrower chose a1 at t-0. The reason for this belief ís that 1t Ss common
knowledge that the borrower purchased a loan coamitment at t~0 and that the
bank selling the commitment designed ita commítment contract to be incentive
compatible and induce a choíce of e1. Thus, the beliefs of spot lenders are
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rationalized in equílibriu~. Ot course, é is arbítrarily chosen, but that does
not sacrifice any generallty since we will show that our choice of d achieves a
tlrst best level of expected utllity tor the borrower. Fro~ the bank's zero
expected profit conditíon we obtain
g ' Plal) ~(1-AJ(r(a11Rh) - 6]Rf2. (A-10)
Sl~plifying ( A-9) gives
P(aí){~YX(aí,c) t eIl-~]X(a1.B) - er(a1IR~) - ~[1~]ó}-V(al)
Dla2){~i9{(a2,G) ' A(1-W]X(a2.B) - Arla1~RA) - W[1-6Jó}-V(a2)
Since this incentive compatibilíty conditlon holds tightly at the optimum, we
obtain
ó ~ [Ag - V(al) . V(a2)][w{1~){P(al) - P(a2))J-1. (A-12)
where
ag g plal){4ac(a1.G) a 6[1-~]X(a1.8)) - fP(al) - p(a2)]er(a11R~)
- p(a2){W X(a2,G) ~ A[1-W]X(a2,8)}.
Substituting (A-12) in (A-l0) produces
gRf ' P(aí){(P(gl)-p(a2)]~[1-9]r(a1~Rh)-aB~V(al)-V(a2)?a8 (A-13)
where a8 S {Rflplal) - p(a2)]}-1.
Now, we want to show that ~~ gRf, so that if LRfE(gRt, ~), then the loan
comsitment can resolve moral hazard but spot borrowing cum equity cannot.
Using the equation
Rf[P(al)]-1 ' er(a1~R~I - [1-9Ir(allRh).
and (A-8) with (A-13), we know that ~ i gRf it
{V(al) - V(a2) - a7}{gr(a1~Rg)}-1
{[P(aí) - pla2)J~L1~JrlallRh) - a8 ~ V(al) - V(a2)?a8 (A-14)
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where a8~ w (Ar(a1~RA) i (1~]r(a1~Rb)}-1.
Cross ~ultiplying ln (A-14) gives
erlal~Rf1)[V(a1) - VIa2) - a~} . [1~1r(a1~Rh)Q
er(a1(RA)(Pla1)w[1-9)r(a11Rh) - Pla2)WI1~)r(ai)Rh) - aa . V(a1) - V(az)}
where Q t V(a1) - V(a2)
- D(a1){WX(a1.G) ~ A[1-W]X(a1,8) - Ar(a1)R~)- [1-A]`Pr(a11Rh))
~ P(a2)A[WX(a2.c) t [1-W)x(aZ.B) - r(a1~RA)]
Stsplifying, we get the following conditíon that should hold
AZr(a1~RQ)p(a2)v~x(a2, G) r [1-e)r(a11Rh)Q
- 6 [1-9]`Yp(a2)r(a1~RA)r(a11Rh) t A `F'r(a11RR)p(a2)X(a2,G),
which, after some rearrangement, produces
- 9[1-~]`YP(a2)r(a11R~)X(a2.G) ~ - 9I1-9]`PP(a2)r(ai(RR)r(a1(Rh)
- (1-6]r(a1~Rh)Q. (A-15)
Now, usíng (PR-3) ín conjunction with (PR-2) gives us the following verslon of
(PR-2)
p(a2)[9 ~Y(X(a2,G) - r(a1~RA)] t A[1-W]X(a2,B) - r(a11RA)l - V(a2)
P(a1){A ~[Xa1,G) - r(a11RA)] 4 A(1-~J[X(a1,B) - r(a11RA)]
t ~Y[1-A][X(a1,G)- r(a1~Rh)]} - V(a1).
and rearranging this inequality yields
Q ~ 0.
Given ( A-18). a suffictent condition for (A-15) to hold is





~ust hold. This holds by (i) of (PR-3). Thus, we have shown the strict Pareto
do~inance of the loan com~itnent over spot credlt with equity for values of L
setisfyinY L E(Q, ~.~Rtl). It ía nor straightforward to verify that the
borrower'a eapected utility wlth the loan cooatitoent is the sa~e as lts first
best utllity. Q.E.D.
PROOP OP COROLLARY 1: See B-T-U (1987). Q.E.D.
PROOP OP THEOREM 2: Let us start with the deposítors. Because the CD contract
nakes their payoff independent oP the bank's strategy, they do not care about
the bank's strategy. The only important factor Ss the deposltors' belief about
the borrower's action choice. Suppose
Pr(a ~ al) - ~d, Pr(a - a2) ~ 1 - ~d.
That is, Kd is the probability depositors attach to a choíce of al by the
borrower and 1-~d is the probability they attach to a choice of a2. We will
return to these beliefs later on in the proof.
Commitnent Seller's Metastrateey (conditional on borrower buving loan
commltment):
This is relevant only when a borrower coses for a loan commitment. The
probabllity that the borrower will accept the loan comAit~ent is írrelevant for
the commitsent seller. Let the comsitment seller's beliefs about the
borrower's action choice be Qíven by
Pr(a - al) : ~c, Pr(a - a2) - 1 - ~c.
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Since the comsitment seller 1s the last to move, its perfect metastrategy, m,
is QSven by ( A-17) as follows
h if ~c ~ Ir(a11Rh) - 6]~Pla1){r(a1(Rh)-ó?t{1-p(a1))BRfRh ~ S]-1
~- n or h if lic . [r(a1~Rh) - d]IP(a1)ír(a1~Rh)-d}.(1-P(a1)}gRfRh ~ Sj-1 ~A~1
n if !ic ~ Ir(a1~Rh) - d]Ip(al)ir(a1~Rh)-6}t(1-P(a1)}BRfRh ~ S]-1
Now, because S E(S-, S~), it is easy to verify that
Ir(a11Rh) - d]Ip(a1){r(a11Rh)-Q}.{1-P(a1)?gRfRh t S]-1 ~ 1.
Thus, ~- n ís the optimal strategy of the commitment seller.
Borrower's Metastrategy:
We consider the metastrategy of the borrower when it has the choice of
accepting or rejecting the loan commitment contract. Since n is a dominant
strategy for the commitment seller, the borrower's only consistent belief is
Nb - Pr(m a n) ~ 1, 1 -~ - Pr(e ~ n) - 0.
Now,
and
U~ . gRf ~ Un.
U~ ~ Un ( follows from ( PR-2)).
Thus, the borrower chooses s and a2 as part of his eetastrategy, given ~.
Fínally, the metastrategy of the depositors is irrelevant because the
commitment seller seeks no funds at t-0. Q.E.D.
PROOF OP THEORE!1 3: As mentioned earlier, we will consider a bank with N~.
Because the CD contract makes the depositors' payoff independent of the bank's
strategy, their beliefs about that strategy are irrelevant. Only their beliefs
about each borrower's action choice ~atters. As in the previous proof, we
App-10
desígnate their beliefs about that actlon cholce by the probability ft , We willd
argue later on that the only consistent belief for depositors !s to asslgn k. 1,d
Bank's Metastrateey:
This ís relevant only when the borrower comes for a loan comnitaent. The
probabllity that the borrower wlll accept the loan co~nit~ent is trrelevant for
the bank.
Since the bank is the last to nove, its perfect 4etastrategy is given by
h
or h
if ~ ~ D3{D3 . pS}-1
if ~.tb . p3{p3 . 2S}-1 (A-18)
n Sf lib ~ D3{D3 . 2S}-1
where ,ub 1s the probability the bank assigns to the borrower having chosen al, and
D3 - W{Rh - p(al)d}. We now discuss the bank's consistent belieP at its
information set. It !s useful to begin by noting that a - al is a dominant
strategy for the borrower which accepts a loan cosn~itment, since l,'h ~ Uh. Thus,
belief of the bank (or the deposi[ors) that puts positive weight on a- a2, On
the other hand, if the bank believes that the borrower chose a- al, then
according to its metastrategy it must decide to honor the commitment, and this
decision indeed makes it optimal for the borrower to have chosen a - al. This
implies that the only consistent belief at the bank's information set is
~- 1. Thus, the bank's optimal choice ís h. The borrower -- who is the
ínformed player in this game -- has a ~netastrategy which is reduced to a usual
strategy, given the fact that the borrower has already accepted the loan
commitn~ent. This ls because if the borrower does not accepi the loan commitment,
the bank has no metastrateeY. Now, since D3 {D3 t 2S}-1 t 1, we need ~.e.b to exceed
a nu~ber less than 1 Ln order for s-h. This i s certainly true since the only
consistent belief of the bank is ~ z 1.
Note that the depositor's only consistent be11eP ís ftd . 1, using argusents
App-11
we need ~ to exceed a number less than 1 in order for m-h. This is certainly
true alnce the only consistent belief of the bank is ~- 1.
Note that the depositor's only consistent belief ís ~d - 1, using arguments
aimilar to those used for the bank. Thus, they w111 supply deposits at the stated
terms.
Generallzed Borrower Metastrate~v:
Me now consíder the borrower's metastrategy when it has the choice of
accepting or re~ecting the loan commitment contract. Let ~ be the probability
assigned by the borrower that the bank wíll honor the loan commitment. A
necessary condition for the borrower to choose to purchase the loan commitment is
~ ' [u2 4 gR2 - u1][u1 - ul]-1 (A-ls)n f n h n
that We also need to rule out the possibility that !t is optimal for the borrower
to accept the loan commitment at t-0 and then choose a2. (Our earlier incentive
compatibility conditions do not help here since they assume ~}-1). Thus, we need
n '- (u~ - Un](uh - Uh - U~ . u~)-1. (a-20)
Now, 1f ( A-19) holds and (A-20) does not, then the borrower will accept the loan
commltment and choose a2. So, we want (A-20) to hold automatically when (A-19)
holds. In that case, a borrower whích chooses a loan commitment will always
choose al. That is, we need
"2 "] "1 "2 " 1 "2 -1 "2 2 " 1 "1 "1 -1(un - un](uh - Uh - un t Un] ~( Un t gRf - un](Uh - unl (A-2])
It is easy to aee that, if (A-21) holds, then Y) can be a probability. This is
because Uh ~ U~ ~ gRf, implying that
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[~~ ~ gRt - U~](Uh - Un]-1 ~ 1.
As long as (A-21) holds, it is possible to have ~ E(0, 1J such that the borrower
buys a loan commltment at t-0 and chooses al. However, we have argued that once
the bank issues a commltment, ite dominant strategy, io conjunction with its own
consSstent belief about ai, is to honor the coniitment. Thus, the only consistent
belief is for the borrower to set r}~1. The question now ts: does (A-21) hold?
To verify this, note that after some algebra, we can rearrange (A-21) as
(~1 - U2 '2 "1 "2 "2 -1 '2 '1 2 -1
h h } (Un - Un])(Uh - Un} ~ (Un - Un){gRf) . (A-21)'
Now, since Uh ~ Uh and U~ ~ U~ (see the proof of Theorem 2), we are done if
Uh-U~ ~ gRf. But this is certainly true since Uh - U~ ~~{1-6]p(a2)[r(a1~Rh1-ó]
2and gRf -~(1-6]p(al)(r(ai~Rh} - d]. Thus, (A-21)' holds, which means (A-21)
holds.
Pinally, a comment on strategíes off the equilibrium path. A borrower with
a z al will sue the bank if the latter reneges, since the borrower is better off
ex post if it sues. Moreover, the courts will prematurely liquidate the bank's
projects since the borrower collects e ~ 0 per project, i.e., St Is not ex post
ineffícient for the borrower to force the bank to liquidate its equityholders'
projects. Q.E.D.
TABLB 1: DESCRIPTION OP STATES AT t-1 AND BORRONER TAKEDONN BEHAVIOR
Stnte Probability Borrower Decislona
Action a1 Actlon a2
E1 ~(O.RR) V6 lavest, no LC takedown. Invest, no LC takedown.
EZ a(G,Rh) W[1~] Invest, takedown LC. Invest, takedorn LC
(do not lnvest without LC).
E3 w(B,RR) [1-~]A Invest, no LC takedown. Invest, no LC takedown.
E4 e(B,Rh) [1-~J[1~] Do not invest; coaaitaent Do not invest.
seller can also costiesaly
reneee on LC.
Note: LC ~eans "loan co~~itwent."
TABLE 2: PAYOFFS OP DEPOSITORS, COMMITMENT SELLER AND BORRONER
FOR DIPFERENT STATES (EXCEPT QZ) AND STRATEGIES (ALL PAYOFFS AT t-2)
(Assu~e Borrorer Chooses al)
3TATB DEPOSITOR'S PAYOFF COMMITMENT SELLER'S (C.S.) PAYOPP BORROMER'S PAYOPP
At t-1 At t-2 C.S. Honors LC C.S. Reneges C.S. Honors LC C.S. Reneges C.S. Honors LC C.S. Reneges
project gRfR~ gRfRA X(al,Gl-V(aí) X(aI,G)-V(aí)
eucceeds 4 RRIP(al)]-I 4RRIp(al))-I S S -gRfRR-R~(p(aI)]-I -BRfRR-RRIp(aí)]-7
E1
project gRfRR gRtRR S S -V(aI)-gRiRA -V(aí)-gRfRA
fails
pro~ect gRfRR gRjRR X(al,Bl-V(aí) X(eI,B)-V(aí)
eucceeda F RAIp(aI))-1 ~RAIp(aí)1-í S S -SRfRa-RAIp(aí1]-I -gRfRA-RR(p(elll~
E3
project gRfRQ gRfR~ S S -V(aI)-gRfRR -V(aI)-gRfRA
faíls
project gRfRh gRrRh -Vlaí)-gRtRh -V(aí)-BRfRh
succeeds t RRlplaí)]-í tR~Ip(aI))-I S S
E4
pro~ect gRfRh gRfRh S S -V(a )-gRfRh -V(aí)-gRtRh
faíls
í
TABLE 2': PAYOFFS OF UEPOSITORS, COMMITMENT SELLER AND BORROWER FOR STATE
~ AND DIFFERENT STRATEGIES IALL PAYOFPS AT T-2)
States et t-2 Payoff to Deposltors Coeeítwent Seller's Coeeiteent Nolder'9
of Co~~it~ent Seller Payoff Payoff
Connit~ent Spot C.S. C.S. C.S. C.S. C.S. C.S.
Nolder Borrower Honora LC Reneges Honors LC Reneges Honora LC Renegea
Project gRfRh . d gRfRh[plal))-i S 0 Xlaí,G)-V(al) X(a1,G) - V(a1)
Project Succeeda . d - gRfRn - ó t S' - d - gRfRh[p(al)
Succeeda Project gRrRh ; d 0 S 0 X(aí,G)-V(aí) X(a1,G)-V(aí)
Faíls - gRrRh - d - Rhlplal))-~ ' S~
Project gRfRh gRfRh 4 d S Rh(p(a1)~-i - V(a1) -V181) ' gRfRh
Project Succeeds -gRfRh-d.S - gRfRh
Faíls Project gRPRh gRfRh S S -V(ai) -V(a1) - gRfRh
Pells - gRfRh
TABLE 3: PAYOPAS OP DEPOSITORS, BANK AND BORROWER IN DIFFERENT STATES
AND STRATEGIES (PAYOPFS AT T-2 FOR EACH SPOT RATE REALIZATION,
~ E{RR, Rh), WITH EXPECTATION TAKEN ACROSS SUCCESS AND PAILURE STATES
AT t-2. BORROWER CHOOSES aI)
STATB DBPOSITORS' PER CAPITA EXPECTED BANK'S PER CAPITA EXPECTED PAYOPF BORROKER'3 EXPECTED PAVOPP
PAYOPP
k - G k - B
At t-1 Bank Honors LC Bank Reneges Bank Honors LC Bank Reneges Bank Honors LC Bank Reneges
R'RR RR.SRfRR RRfgR~RR S S Ui U~ U3
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PIGURE 2~ EXTENSIVE FORy FOR COMMITMENT GA.ME
Borrower
Note: At all of the decision nodes aligned ver2ically above or below a given box, the
party whose turn i t is to move is indicated Sn that box.
D1 - p(al)IgRfRh t S' ~ p(al){Rhlp(aI)~-1 - SRfRhIp(al))-1 - d}]
DZ e[1-p(al))~Rh - p(al)gRfRh - p(el)ó t S~
FIGURE 3: "COtiDE~SED" EXTENSIVE FORM FOR CO!G~IITMENT GAME
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